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‘We, the Peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the 
human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called the Moral 
Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority which 
lives on other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war, and that 
whatever strength we have will always be thrown on the side of peace.’ 
  - Sukarno, 6 June 1901 – 21 June 1970 
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Thesis Abstract 
In 1945, fifty – one nations came together for the first time and declared, ‘we the 
peoples of the United Nations.’ Ten years later, in a very similar gathering, a 
further twenty – nine nations came together and declared, ‘we the peoples of 
Asia and Africa.’ This was the Bandung Conference, an unprecedented event in 
international relations that heralded the end of colonialism. It also signalled the 
beginning of the transformation of the United Nations into an organisation of the 
Global South. 
 
This thesis seeks to reaffirm the place of the Bandung Conference in the history 
of the United Nations, arguing that the UN of today is as much a legacy of what 
happened at Bandung as the San Francisco Conference.  
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A Note on the Use of Capitals and the Use of Other Terms 
 
This thesis employs the convention of capitalising ‘International Relations’ when 
referring to the academic discipline that is concerned with the study of 
‘international relations.’ When used with lower case letters, the term refers to 
the interactions between states and other actors in the real world, and all other 
associated phenomena. When written with capitals, it refers to the academic 
discipline.   
 
Throughout this thesis, the term ‘Third World’ may appear to be used 
interchangeably with a variety of other terms, such as Afro – Asian, Southern and 
developing. Different terms have been used at different times to describe what 
this thesis treats as one overarching identity. The term Southern is more 
pertinent to understanding the identity as it relates to the present day. Hence, it 
is used in the title and in the broader arguments of this thesis. However, the 
word Southern not come into use until the late 1960s. Third World was used 
quite commonly and was a politically correct term for the period in question, and 
is used to refer to the South in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
A Note on the Use of Sources 
This thesis uses standard UN notation when referring to UN resolutions and 
other UN documents. Standard historical referencing is used in conjunction with 
this to identify the published source of the document.   
 
A Note on the Spelling of Indonesian Names 
This thesis may appear to have some inconsistencies in the spelling of certain 
Indonesian names. Since 1972, there have been two systems in place for the 
transliteration of Indonesian names into the Latin alphabet. These are the 
Perfected Spelling System (EYD) and the Soewandi Spelling System. This thesis 
uses the Soewandi Spelling System, where Sastroamijoyo (EYD) is spelt 
Sastroamidjojo. In regards to references and direct quotations, all names are 
spelt as they appeared in the original source.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 In April 1955 in the Indonesian City of Bandung, there occurred an 
extraordinary gathering. For the first time in history, the peoples of the nations 
of Asia and Africa came together in a free international setting to determine their 
own future. At this meeting, they made a declaration of solidarity to aid each 
other in development and stand together against the continuing bane of 
imperialism. They eschewed militarism and declared that their success lay in the 
way of peaceful negotiation. Most importantly, they affirmed the role of the 
United Nations as a force for good. This was despite the fact that a great number 
of these states were either not yet members of the UN, or only had a marginal 
role in the organisation.  
The event was a watershed in international and diplomatic history. For 
centuries, the majority of the world’s diplomacy had been conducted in the 
‘Concert of Europe.’1 Decisions that would have some of the most global 
implications were determined by small and unrepresentative gatherings. The 
scramble for Africa was a prime example, where amongst themselves the 
European powers achieved a ‘compromise’ that would affect the lives of millions 
for the next century.2 Even as far forward as 1944, it was a small gathering of 
largely Western states that created the Bretton Woods system.3 The state of 
                                                        
1 Paul M. Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations 
(New York, NY.: Random House, 2006), p. 2. 
2 For a very comprehensive collection of primary documents concerning the scramble for Africa, 
see R.J. Galvin, The Scramble for Africa: Documents on the Berlin West African Conference and 
Related Subjects, 1884/1885, Compiled Edited and Translated from the French and German by R.J. 
Gavin and J.A. Betley (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1973).  
3 There were 44 countries in attendance at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Those were 
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, French Delegation, Greece, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
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international relations before WWII is best articulated by the Indian historian 
Singh. He argues that outside of Europe and the Americas, ‘horizontal 
relationships’ in the international sphere were restricted.4 Colonies rarely 
interacted with each other, and were often communicatively closer to their far – 
flung imperial centres than their immediate neighbours. 5  Post – war 
decolonisation changed this by allowing for new spaces of interaction between 
hitherto internationally isolated peoples. The new nations of Asia and Africa 
could now interact and find common ground on their own terms, often playing 
the game of their old masters.  
The Asian African Conference (Bandung Conference), held between 29 
recently decolonised states was one such opportunity. Appraisals of the 
conference have often focused on this aspect. 6 Richard Wright, an attendant and 
observer of the conference, noted it as an opportunity for the many oppressed 
peoples of the world to build trust and build new diplomatic networks.7 For the 
world at large, especially observers in the developed states, the conference was a 
rather novel event that heralded the coming end of the colonial age. Journalists 
in the Washington Post portrayed it as the final shedding of European 
                                                                                                                                                              
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, USSR, 
UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. For a good critical analysis of the Bretton Woods 
system and how it affected the global financial system, see Barry Eichengreen, Global Imbalances 
and Lessons of Bretton Woods (Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economics Research, 2004).  
4 Jagmohan Singh, Emerging International Order and Non-Aligned Movement (New Delhi: Kanisha 
Publishers, Distributors, 1996), p. 2. 
5 Singh, Emerging International Order, p. 5.  
6 See for example Ali Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey (1956; republished St. Lucia, Qld: 
Queensland University Press, 1979). 
7 Richard Wright, The Color [sic] Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (1956; republished 
Jackson, MS.: Banner Books, 1995), p. 174.  
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colonialism.8 For diplomats in Washington, it was regarded with suspicion as a 
forum liable to communist infiltration.9  
The Bandung Conference was instrumental in the creation of two key 
organisations in the following years. The first was the Non – Aligned Movement 
(NAM), an organisation of largely ‘Southern’ states who sought to stay neutral in 
the Cold War. The NAM was officially created in 1961, and by 1970 had a 
membership of 70.10 Today, it has a membership of 120, with 18 observer 
countries.11 The second organisation was the Group of 77 (G77), a caucus made 
up of less developed countries that operated in most international economic 
fora, most prominently in the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).12  The existence of the above two organisation however 
were dependent on the creation of a more abstract concept that was more 
immediately tied to the Bandung Conference. This was the ‘Third World’ or 
‘Global South,’ a transnational identity that had post – racial and post – colonial 
dimensions. 13  With some variations, there were some key markers that 
                                                        
8 See for example: No Author, ‘Colonialism is Assailed at Bandung’, The Washington Post and 
Times Herald, 18 April 1955, p. 1; No Author, ‘Eclipse at Bandung’, The Washington Post and 
Times Herald, April 26, 1955, p. 20.  
9 See for example an article in the Washington Post commenting on the problem of the 
attendance of China and other communist countries, and praising India’s ostensibly pro – 
Western stance: Peter Jackson, ‘Nehru to Work Hard at Bandung Against Forming Anti – Western 
Bloc’, The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 15 1955, p. 4.  
10 For a record of the membership of the Non – Aligned Movement in 1970, see the minutes of the 
‘Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non – Aligned Countries’ in Jugoslovenska 
Stvarnost, Documents of the Gatherings of Non – Aligned Countries: 1961 – 1978 (Belgrade: 
Jugoslovenska Svarnost, 1978), pp. 41 – 42.  
11 Current membership of the Non – Aligned Movement, including all observers is available on 
the public website of the NAM, viewed 06 February 2012, 
http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm.  
12 The Group of 77 was established on the 15th of June 1964 at the first session of the United 
Nations Conference of Trade and Development upon the signage of the ‘Joint Declaration of the 
Seventy – Seven Countries.’ Despite still being called the G-77, the group now has 132 members. 
For more information, see Group of 77, ‘About the Group of 77’, accessed 01 May 2012 on 
http://www.g77.org/doc/index.html#establish.   
13 Alfred Sauvy coined the term ‘Third World’ in 1952 in an article of L’Observateur in relation to 
an analysis of the state of the Cold War. By the late 1950s, it was used in a more expansive 
fashion to refer to an identity. A series of other terms are often used to substitute the identity 
 4 
determined whether a country was ‘Third World,’ other than their geographical 
location or their position in the international political landscape. These were: 
being non – white or non – European; an experience of colonialism or quasi – 
colonialism; and underdevelopment. It almost always followed that ‘Third 
World’ also meant being Asian, African or Latin American; i.e. Southern.14 
Understandably, the Bandung Conference and its ensuing movements 
have generated substantial attention among international and transnational 
historians with post – colonial inclinations.15 Some of these histories have 
focused on the conference’s cultural impact in the non – white and non – 
Western world. Others have examined its role in Asian regionalism and the 
development of organisation like ASEAN.16 However, in regard to histories of the 
birth and growth of the United Nations, the Bandung Conference occupies a 
marginal place. Such histories tend to focus on the San Francisco Conference and 
on the immediate post – war period. This is taken as part of a longer story that 
started with the League of Nations and ended with World War II. San Francisco, 
for most, was the first time the entirety of the globe had come together, forming 
a global charter and later the Universal Declaration of Rights. It was the 
beginning of the age of internationalism.  
                                                                                                                                                              
named above. These include: southern, underdeveloped, developing, Afro – Asian or majority 
world.  
14 The latter of these three occupies a more complex position in the North / South divide, with 
Latin American states being buttressed between the Southern World and the New World.  
15 See for example: Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World 
(London and New York, NY.: The New Press, 2007); Anthony Reid, ‘the Bandung Conference and 
South East Asian Regionalism’, in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The 
Legacy of the 1955 Asian – African Conference for International Order (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2008), pp. 19 – 26; Kristin S. Tassin, ‘”Lift Up Your Head My 
Brother”: Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non – Aligned Movement’, Journal of Third World 
Studies, 23, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 147 – 168.   
16 See for example Itty Abraham, ‘Bandung and State Formation in South East Asia’, in See Seng 
Tan & Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian – African Conference 
for International Order (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), pp. 54 – 57.  
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 The United Nations that emerged in the late 1940s however was hardly 
the organisation we know today. In 1955, the General Assembly represented 
only 60% of the world’s countries, and had staff composed largely of Americans 
and Western Europeans.17 The budget of the organisation was, by today’s 
standards, quite small, which meant that the organisation didn’t conduct many 
initiatives independently.18 In terms of its real costs and functions, the UN in its 
early years can better be described as a rubber stamp organisation for the 
actions and spending of its members. It was also the case, especially with the 
executive power of the Security Council, that the United Nations was a way for 
larger powers to legitimately keep smaller powers in check.19 
The transformation of the United Nations (save the Security Council) from 
a small, Western – based political forum to a global and proactive agent of 
change occurred as a result of the initiative and the very UN positive outlook of 
the Southern or Third World countries. With the power of numbers and the 
strategy of bloc voting, these countries commanded the floor of the General 
Assembly, taking it in directions never intended by the victors of World War II. 
This direction was three fold. Firstly, the United Nations increasingly became a 
forum for economic and developmental issues. This was not the intention at its 
founding in the 1940s, with a preference among the big players to rely on the 
                                                        
17 For the history of UN membership, see The Public website of the United Nations, ‘Growth in the 
United Nations Membership’, viewed 01 April 2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml. For a history of staffing in the United Nations 
see Than Myint-U & Amy Scott The UN Secretariat: A Brief History (New York, NY.: International 
Peace Academy, 2007), pp. 73 – 78. 
18 The budget of the United Nations for the year 1954 - 1956 was $50,665,670 ($432,050,000 CPI 
to 2012). The budget for the year 1976 – 1977 was $745,813,800 ($3,006,813,000 CPI to 2012). 
Factoring CPI, this was a little over a six-fold increase in the UN’s budget from the years 1954 – 
1976. Budgets for every year are available on the public website of the United Nations under GA 
resolution, viewed 14 March 2012, http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm.  
19 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, p. 18.  
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Bretton Woods system to ensure the stability of the global economy.20 Secondly, 
the bureaucracy of the United Nations started to become more reflective of its 
representation. In the 1940s and 50s, the staff of the United Nations were 
primarily of Western backgrounds. This was not the case by 1970, when the 
majority of the staff and the leadership came from the developing world.21 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the organisation in its central aims remained 
intact. Holding the majority of the floor, the very existence of the Non – Aligned 
Movement ensured that the United Nations fell neither to the Western bloc nor 
the Eastern bloc, at least in the case of the General Assembly. While the 
sanctioning of force would always be at the discretion of the P5, the normative, 
political, directional, legal and most importantly budgetary aspects of the United 
Nations stayed in the hands of the South.  
 
This thesis argues that the Bandung Conference was an essential moment 
in the evolution of the United Nations into a global organisation. This was 
because it created the Third World, a transnational identity that allowed for the 
development of the Non – Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The result of 
this was a ‘southernisation’ of the United Nations, whereby it became a site of 
tension between the developed North and the decolonising South. Furthermore, 
the thesis argues the Bandung Conference had roots in the Afro – Asian 
Solidarity Movement, which was an internationalist movement with a 
                                                        
20 See Barry Eichengreen, Global Imbalances and Lessons of Bretton Woods, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT 
Press, 2006). 
21 No Author, ‘Denying Any Bias, UN Reports a Rise in Africans on Staff’, New York Times, 16 
February 1966, p. 7.  
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completely separate history to the various forms of internationalism at play in 
the Western world that led to the UN Charter. 
The first chapter will look at the growth of Afro – Asian Solidarity as a 
transnational and multinational movement, comparing it with the ideology of 
liberal internationalism in Europe and North America. It will begin by analysing 
some the historical literature regarding the creation and success of the United 
Nations. It will look at the growth and the origins of cosmopolitanism, and how 
this formed the basis for liberal internationalism. It will then argue that the 
creation of the United Nations Charter was a synthesis of these ideals and the 
common experience of WWII between the Western and Eastern blocs. The 
chapter will then contrast this to the development of Afro – Asian Solidarity, 
arguing that it had roots in Pan – Asianism, Pan – Nationalism and Anti - 
Imperialism. The chapter will conclude by arguing that these movements 
ultimately coalesced into a common perception of the world and common 
approach to international relations among many newly decolonising states in 
Africa and Asia. The common perception was that the old imperial powers of 
Europe continued to reap the benefits of their history while the countries of 
Africa and Asia were dealt a poor lot in the post – war world. 
The second chapter will look at the Bandung Conference itself and how it 
was the place by which the norms that constituted the Third World identity were 
created. Using memoirs from the leaders of the 5 sponsoring countries, the 
chapter will present an overview of the immediate politics behind the 
conference. It will argue that the actions of these countries on the international 
sphere were coloured by the history of Afro – Asian solidarity and the preceding 
movements of Pan – Asianism, Pan - Nationalism and Anti – Imperialism. 
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Following this, the chapter will present a description and analysis of the 
conference using various accounts by observers and attendees. It will argue that 
the conference resolved many tension between the many African and Asian 
states and created a common understanding of international relations in the final 
communiqué. It will then argue that this communiqué became a series of norms 
that were increasingly taken up by many newly independent states in Asia and 
Africa. The norms were: non - alignment; commitment to the United Nations; 
commitment to disarmament and nuclear non – proliferation; hostility towards 
imperialism; mutual support for struggles of national liberation; and a 
commitment to mutual economic assistance.  The chapter will conclude by 
examining how these various norms translated into the two dominant 
institutions of the Global South: The Non  - Aligned Movement and the Group of 
77. 
 The final chapter will look at the impact of the Bandung Conference on 
the UN by way of creating the Non – Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. It 
will begin by examining the immediate responses in the United Nations towards 
the conference, in the context of increasing tensions over UN membership. It will 
argue the Bandung Conference was an important factor in the general push to 
make UN membership universal. The chapter will then look at the lasting impact 
of both the Non - Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, and how this changed 
the United Nations from a characteristically Western Organisation to a Global 
organisation, one where the South was dominant in all spheres except the 
Security Council. It will thus conclude that the Bandung conference forms a 
central part of the History of the United Nations in its current form. 
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The conclusion will look at how the actions of the Southern countries 
were part of a transnational identity, and cannot be explained by the 
conventional theories of International Relations. It will conclude that the 
Bandung Conference held an essential place in the transformation of the United 
Nations into the organisation that it is today, and should be regarded with the 
same important as the San Francisco Conference. The thesis will finish by 
offering a question, namely why the Bandung Conference has been so forgotten 
in popular histories of the UN. 
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Chapter One 
Two Visions of International Order: Liberal Internationalism 
and Afro – Asian Solidarity 
 The post war period saw the rise of institutionalised international law 
and a proliferation of international organisations. The United Nations especially 
is a defining feature of the last 60 years and is a key separator for most 
International Relations theorists and international historians between the age of 
global anarchy, and the relative peace following 1945.22 With a continuous 
structure stretching 65 years, it is older than the majority of the world’s states, 
and certainly older than all but a small handful of the world’s constitutions.23 
Furthermore, it stands hand in hand with the domination of the Westphalian 
state system. The latter statement is based on the fact that every bit of land 
(except for Antarctica) now falls under a sovereign state. Furthermore, all states 
are members of the United Nations, with membership now being one of the 
primary delineations between de facto and de jure states.24   
The success of the United Nations has come to form a kind of folklore in 
the history of international relations, at least for those who argue for the ideals 
of the United Nations Charter. For those supportive, the trend is to place focus on 
the San Francisco Conference, the moment at which the peoples of the world first 
came together. The international historian Ian Hurd, a supporter of international 
                                                        
22 See for example Samuel M. Makinda, ‘The United Nations and State Sovereignty: Mechanisms 
for Managing International Security’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 33, No. 1 (1998), pp. 
106 – 107. 
23 It is difficult to give a definitive number here given varying definition of what is meant by 
continuously independent. Just prior the creation of the United Nations, there were sixty widely 
recognised independent states, many of which had just been freed from German occupation. 
Many states however lost their independence over WWII, Serbia being one example.  
24 See Mikulas Fabry, Recognising States: International Society and the Establishment of New States 
Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 8. Three widely recognised independents 
states remain non – members of the UN. These are: Vatican City; Kosovo; Taiwan.  
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governance, describes a ‘politics of legitimacy’ that was at play in San 
Francisco.25 Whereby international anarchy had been the norm in regards to 
international security before 1945, the inaugural conferences of the United 
Nations created new ‘imagined institutions.’26 This was, according to Hurd, 
expressed by a growing belief among states that they ‘ought to resolve their 
conflicts, coordinate their relations, and facilitate coexistence.’27 While Hurd’s 
argument is primarily an institutional one, outlining the development of norms 
in the international sphere, Karn and Mingst argue that the UN was based in the 
common memory of the founding states.28 They assert that ‘the establishment of 
the United Nations in the closing days of World War II was an affirmation of the 
desire of war weary nations for an organisation that could help them avoid 
future conflicts and foster international economic and social cooperation.’29 
Mark Mazower, another historian of the United Nations has referred to ‘the 
hopes of 1945,’ arguing that the project of the UN was ultimately guided by 
utopianism.30 This gave it ‘energy, support, and in certain circumstances, 
valuable political capital.’31 A discernable theme across the literature is that San 
Francisco was a moment of triumph for the whole of humanity. Indeed, for 
collective memory in the Anglosphere, San Francisco would be one of the main 
separators between the period of general strife characterised by the two world 
                                                        
25 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council,  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 91. 
26 Hurd, After Anarchy, p. 91.  
27 Hurd, After Anarchy, p. 91.   
28 Karen A. Mingst & Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century: Third Edition 
(Boulder, CO: Colorado University Press, 2007), p. 2.  
29 Mingst & Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century, p. 2.  
30 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 2. 
31 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, p. 6. 
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wars and the Great Depression, and the relative peace and prosperity of the Baby 
Boom.  
 There is another story that acts as a source of collective security and 
global triumph for the majority of the world’s nations.  This story is not related 
to the victory of WWII, but to the decline of colonialism and the newfound unity 
of many former colonies in the 1950s. This was the Afro – Asian Solidarity 
Movement, an unprecedented transnational movement that spurred a series of 
opportunities for peoples that had for centuries been cut off from international 
channels of diplomacy. The Afro – Asian Solidarity movement would develop 
into the Non Aligned movement and the Group of 77, which effectively controlled 
the floor of the General Assembly and thus the United Nations.  
This chapter argues that the Afro – Asian Solidarity Movement was an 
internationalist ideology with its own transnational roots, entirely separate from 
the internationalism that was at play in the Western World. It will begin by 
presenting a brief history of Liberal Internationalism, the driving ideology for the 
project of the United Nations. It will then go on to present a brief history of 
internationalism in Africa and Asia. It will argue that the main international 
movements with which people in these regions had engaged in the early 
twentieth century were Pan – Nationalism, Pan – Asianism and Anti – 
Imperialism. These movements weighed on the minds of the diplomatic elite in 
many of the states in South and South East Asia. This ultimately led to the 
development of Afro – Asian Solidarity as a post – war movement.  
 
 
 13 
Internationalism and the Second World War: The Ideological Roots of the 
United Nations 
 
The creation of the United Nations was a product of internationalism, an 
ideological current that had gained increasing popularity and legitimacy in 
Europe and North America throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. According to Carlsten Holbraad, internationalism is ‘the ideology of 
international bonding,’ and is marked by ‘a preference for utilizing international 
bodies in the conduct of world affairs and, more typically, by a degree of 
enthusiasm for the strengthening [of] such instrumentalities.’32 Holbraad’s 
describes three main forms of internationalism: Liberal; Conservative and 
Marxist.33  
Liberal internationalism had its roots in the related concept of 
cosmopolitanism, which was the belief in and commitment to a ‘common 
humanity,’ whose interests transcend that of the nation – state.34 While most of 
the basic tenets of cosmopolitanism are quite ancient, its application to the 
modern state system can be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace.35 In 
this seminal work, Kant argued that world peace was both achievable and was 
the highest state of human achievement. Furthermore, he set out the conditions 
under which world peace could occur. The conditions were: that all states are 
constitutional republics; that the sovereignty of all states are respected; that 
there shall exist a ‘law of nations’ which governs conduct between states; and 
                                                        
32  Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York, NY.: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003), p. 2.  
33 Holbraad, International and Nationalism, p. 3.  
34 Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism, p. 2.  
35 See Gary K. Browning, Global Theory from Kant to Hardt to Negri (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshite: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 23 – 24.  
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that ‘the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal 
hospitality.’36 The value of the ideology is the whole of humanity, and its 
synthesis is a particular model of international organisation, namely a world of 
independent republics that cooperate voluntarily. As the international historian 
Browning argues, Kant’s arguments formed the foundation stone of liberal 
internationalism, a normative theory that sought to achieve a world of 
prosperous and mutually cooperative sovereign states.37 The liberal IR scholar 
Rasmussen argues that liberalism ‘formulates as a universal law that has been 
guiding Western peacemaking in the twentieth century.’38 
Liberal Internationalism featured quite heavily in the League of Nations, 
and is argued by some historians to have been a driving factor.39 It was certainly 
a strong influence for Woodrow Wilson, the person assumed by many historians 
of international relations to be the original international advocate for a liberal 
world order.40 In his speech on the fourteen points, Wilson referred to a  
‘universal human sympathy’ later saying that ‘our [America’s] program is one of 
world peace.’41 This was much in line with Kant’s vision of an international 
system based on ‘universal hospitality.’ The link between the League and the 
United Nations is a matter of ongoing debate, with some arguing it was a 
complete failure, and others positing otherwise. A proponent of the former is 
                                                        
36 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, Nicholas M. Butler, ed. (New York, NY.: Columbia University 
Press, 1939), pp. 3 – 9, p. 23. 
37 Browning, Global Theory from Kant to Hardt to Negri, p. 25.  
38 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The West, Civil Society and the Construction of Peace (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire and New  York, NY.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 16.  
39 See for example, Daniel Gorman, ‘Liberal Internationalism, The League of Nations Union and 
the Mandates System’, Canadian Journal of History, 40, No. 3 (December 2005), pp. 449 – 452;  
George Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations (London: Hutchinson, 1973).  
40 See for example John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and 
the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge and New York, NY.: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp. 12 – 13.  
41 Record of President Woodrow Wilson’s speech on the Fourteen Points, available on ‘Our 
Documents’, viewed 3 April 2012, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=62.  
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George Scott, who begins with this premise in his book, Rise and Fall of the 
League.42 The main question in Scott’s book is why the League failed.43 The 
contemporary historian Ruth Hening, on the other hand, argues that the League 
created the intellectual foundations for many of the constituent institutions of 
the UN, most notably the International Court of Justice.44 Whether the League 
was formally tied to the League of Nations, it is certain that the intellectual 
currents that formed it were still present at the founding of the UN. Liberal 
Internationalist rhetoric abounds quite strongly in the Preamble to the Charter. 
The use of the phrase ‘good neighbours,’ stemming from Kant’s concept of 
‘universal hospitality’ is one example. Reference to ‘social progress’ achieved by 
‘international machinery’ would be another.45  
Any argument that considers Liberal Internationalism as a driving factor 
in the UN would be based on two key assumption of the liberal tradition. The 
first is that the actions of states are rational, meaning that the intentions of all 
the relevant actors correspond with their actions.46 The second is that the liberal 
world order was indeed the intention of the main founders UN.47 Liberal 
Internationalism certainly wasn’t guiding the Soviet Union at San Francisco nor, 
many would argue, the United States. From a realist perspective, the UN exists 
only at the behest of the most powerful states, and is the sum total of a particular 
configuration of state interests. As summed up by Holbraad, realists conceive the 
                                                        
42 Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League, pp. 1 – 4.  
43 Scott, Rise and Fall of the League, p. 14.  
44 Ruth Henig, ‘A League of Its Own’, History Today, 60, No. 2 (February 2010), p. 3.  
45Charter of the United Nations, available on the public website of the United Nations, viewed 15 
April 2012, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.  
46 For a good introduction to critiques of rationalist approaches from an International Relations 
perspective, see Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (re)introduction to 
International Relations  (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).  
47 Such is the realist critique of liberal internationalism that emerged from the 1950s. For a good 
introduction to the theory from an International Relations perspective, see Jack Donelly, Realism 
and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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international system as a ‘multiplicity of sovereign states engaged in continual 
interaction.’48 Paul Kennedy, author of the Parliament of Man, takes this view. 
Kennedy focuses on the United Nations as a negotiated outcome between the five 
victors of WWII, later the P5.49 As the primary site of international relations in 
the 19th century, Europe had been protected from conflict by a balance of power 
between the British and Russian Empires.50 These two countries were what 
Kennedy calls ‘flank powers.’51 In the early Twentieth Century, the flank powers 
became the United States and the USSR. However, both of these countries had 
retreated from the international system and resorted to isolationism.52 It was 
this lack of balance, Kennedy states, which led to the aggression of the Axis 
Powers.53 In Kennedy’s view, the United Nations ultimately emerged because the 
great powers agreed it was the only way to prevent the rise of another Germany 
or Japan.54 Furthermore, its purpose is to entrench the power of those states, as 
is demonstrated by the structure of the Security Council. As Kennedy states, ‘if a 
powerful state should decide to defy the world body and go it alone, then there 
was little that could be done to prevent it . . . If lesser states broke the rules, they 
might well get spanked.’55  
What both liberal and realist theories fail to consider is that the United 
Nations was a product of a particular shared understanding of the world. The 
Constructivist theory sheds more light on the United Nations from a historical 
perspective, as an institution based on the common experience of the 
                                                        
48 Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism, p. 48.  
49 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, pp. 26 – 30.  
50 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, p. 15.  
51 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, pp. 13 – 16.  
52 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, p. 15.  
53 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, pp. 15 – 16.  
54 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, pp. 15 – 17.  
55 Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, pp. 29 – 30.  
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participating countries and on a set of ideologies.56 On one level, this was a 
shared intellectual tradition and shared commitment to a world government. As 
argued above, cosmopolitanism and liberalism shaped the way the world 
leaders, particularly those from Western Europe and North America, approached 
the League of Nations and the United Nations. On the other hand, the structure of 
the United Nations as a peacekeeper was based on the common experience in 
war between the P5 countries, and he common enemy of fascism. The reason the 
United Nations came to be was thus a result of a common narrative between the 
founding states.  
Both narratives, whether they’re based in realism or liberalism, see the 
United Nations as either a product of Western liberal internationalism, or a 
negotiated outcome between the Soviet Union and the United States. This focus 
completely ignores the modes of internationalism that were at play in what was 
the vast majority of the global population. As was described above, 
internationalism is a ‘preference for utilising international bodies.’ For most of 
the states joining in the UN 50s and 60s, this preference was not based heavily 
on the experiences described above. The internationalism of the African and 
Asian states in the immediate post – war period was based on Afro – Asian 
Solidarity, which had a history rooted in experiences of anti – imperialism and 
national liberation.   
 
 
 
                                                        
56 A feature of constructivism is historical path dependency; states may behave rationally but 
construct the world based on past experience. See Colin Hay, ‘Ideas and the Construction of 
Interest’, in Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox, eds., Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research 
(Oxford and New York, NY.: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 66 – 69.  
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Pan – Asianism, Anti Imperialism and the Afro – Asian Solidarity 
 
For the majority of the world’s states, the experience of their diplomatic 
elite in international relations was more strongly tied to their experience of anti 
– colonial and anti – imperial struggles. When 29 states gathered in the city of 
Bandung, they did so despite having many cultural and political differences. 
However, they produced a rather united stance and came out with a strong 
commitment to the United Nations. The existence of the Bandung Conference, 
much like the San Francisco Conference, was based on a shared experience and a 
shared narrative. The immediate politics behind the Bandung Conference will be 
analysed in the next chapter. In this section, I will argue that three key 
transnational movement movements shaped the approach of the Bandung states 
towards international relations, which ultimately manifested itself as Afro – 
Asian solidarity. These were Pan – Asianism, Pan – Nationalism and Anti – 
Imperialism.  
   
Pan – Nationalism and Pan – Asianism  
 
Pan – Asianism was one very important transnational movement that 
formed an identity above the state for many countries outside of Europe and the 
Americas. In short, Pan – Asianism was a belief in and commitment to a united 
‘Asia’ as a counter to the West. As it played out in world affairs, the ideology has 
often been linked to Japanese nationalism and imperialism.57 Sven Saaler, an 
                                                        
57 See for example, Sven Saaler & J. Victor Koschmann, Pan  - Asianism in Modern Japanese History: 
Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (Oxan: Routledge, 2007); M. Jansen, ‘Pan – Asianism’, in 
Marlene J. Mayo, ed., The Emergence of Imperial Japan: Self Defense or Calculated Aggression 
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historian of modern Japan, locates the origin of Pan – Asianism in the Meji 
Restoration with thinkers such as Okakura Tenshin and Tarui Tokichi, who 
grappled with the question of how Japan should deal with its Asian neighbours.58 
Using the Japanese intellectual Kodera, Saaler argues that it was the underlying 
ideology for Japanese expansion, with the notion of a ‘glorious new civilisation 
under Japanese leadership and guidance.’59 This was obviously accompanied by 
the view that Japan was more advanced and civilised than her Asian neighbours 
and thus had a right and responsibility to lead the region.60  For Eric Hotta, Pan – 
Asianism was a driving factor in Japan’s expansion from 1931 – 1945.61 He 
associates the central tenets of the ideology with the Amo Statement of 1934 
made by Japan’s Foreign Ministry Information Division Chief, something he 
states has widely been dubbed the ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine.’62 
The notion of an Asian alliance standing up against the West however was 
invoked in many national resistance movements across Asia. Such movements 
often characterised their struggle as one of ‘East against West.’63 Cemil Aydin, 
another Asian historian, argues that the Japanese Government merely 
‘appropriated an already existing Pan – Asianist alternative to the Eurocentric 
world order.’64 Much like it’s counterpart in the Arabian world, Pan – Asianism 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1970); Rustin B. Gates, ‘Pan – Asianism in Prewar Japanese Foreign 
Affairs: The Curious Case of Uchida Yasuya’, Journal of Japanese Studies, 37, No. 1 (Winter 2011), 
pp. 1 – 27; Sven Saaler, ‘The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and 
His Treaties on “Greater Asianism” (1916)’, Modern Asian Studies, 41, No. 6 (November 2007), pp. 
1261 – 1294.  
58 Saaler, ‘Regionalism in Modern Japan’, p. 1261. 
59 Kodera, quoted in Saaler, ‘Regionalism in Modern Japan’, p. 1271. 
60 Saaler, ‘Regionalism in Modern Japan’, p. 1271.  
61 Eric Hotta, Pan Asianism and Japan’s War (New York, NY.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 77 – 
83.  
62 Hotta, Pan Aisanism and Japan’s War, p. 79.  
63 Clive Christie, Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia, (Richmond, Curzon Press, 2001), p. 20.  
64 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti – Westernism: Visions of World Order in Pan – Islamic and Pan – 
Asian Thought (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 188.  
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was simply taken as political currency by all aspiring nations. It was thus 
simultaneously a transnational and multinational movement, with different 
countries taking and appropriating its tenets.  
It is therefore rather difficult to identify any one root of Pan – Asianism. In 
the 19th century, Pan – Asianism as a coherent ideology was predominately 
based in China and Japan. In the Chinese case, a prominent example would be the 
scholar Gu Hongming, who dichotomised the ‘spiritual East,’ based in 
Confucianism, with the ‘materialistic West.’65 According to Aydin, the birth of Pan 
– Asianism as a coherent regional ideology was the Russo – Japanese War. The 
war, Aydin argues, ‘established a consciousness of the era as the awakening of 
the East.’66 Immediately following the war, national liberation movements 
around Asia started making serious cases for an Asian alliance. A prominent 
example would be Phan Boi Chau, a Vietnamese intellectual and nationalist.67 It 
was briefly after the 1904 war that Chau wrote his seminal work, Modest 
Proposal for an Asian Alliance, which called for a united Asia.68 Chau was indeed 
motivated by his own nationalism, but believed that a united Asia was in 
everyone’s interest. 
Pan – Asianism was part of a broader trend in the colonised and semi 
colonised world, mirroring other so - called pan – nationalist movements. This 
included Pan – Arabism, Pan – Islamism and, to a lesser extent, Pan – 
                                                        
65 Chunmei Du, ‘Gu Hongming as a Cultural Amphibian: A Confucian Universalist Critique of 
Modern Western Cvilisation’, Journal of World History, 22, No. 4 (December 2011), p. 754. 
Chunmei Du argues that Hongming employed an internationalist interpretation of Confucianism, 
seeing it as a way of uniting Asia. Hongming believed this to be a superior form of 
internationalism to that which permeated Europe, as a united Asia would be more powerful than 
a constantly warring Europe.  
66 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti – Westernism, p. 92.  
67 Christie, Ideology and Revolution, p. 20.  
68 Christie, Ideology and Revolution, p. 22.  
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Africanism. 69  Aydin argues that these movements were predominately 
progressive, modernist and optimistic. 70  According to Riklefs, such was 
characterised by a perception of the West as superior and a resultant desire ‘to 
borrow Western science and technology while maintaining an indigenous 
cultural and religious base.’71 All these movement were a primary way be which 
nationalist intellectual outside of Europe and North America advocated for a unit 
and a goal above the state.  
An examination of Pan – Asianism and more broadly Pan – Nationalism as 
it played out in every national case would be far too expansive for this work. 
Nonetheless, a brief explanation of the role of Pan – Asianism in Indonesia and 
India, two of the key players at Bandung, is necessary.  
India’s engagement with the Pan – Asianism largely stemmed from the 
Indian National Congress’s 1924 Foreign Policy Conference. The conference 
produced two very important doctrines that formed much of the theoretical 
basis for India’s engagement in the East Asia, and thus most of the decolonising 
world after WWII. The first of these was that India’s destiny was linked with her 
Asian neighbours.  Malik, a key intellectual figure in Indian nationalism in the 
1920s, stated that it was ‘an urge, devoid of any desire for the leadership of Asia, 
for friendship, co-operation and partnership with Asian people for freedom, 
                                                        
69 Pan – Africanism in Africa emerged later in the twentieth century than Pan Asian, Pan Islamism 
and Pan Arabism. In the early 20th Century, it was based heavily in the African Diaspora through 
intellectuals like Dubois. There is some debate as to whether Pan – Africanism was a colonial 
product in itself. Pan Africanism in the diaspora had often been linked to ‘returning to Africa.’ The 
return to Africa was advocated for in the Northern United States, and often meant going back to 
the continent to be a missionary. For information on Pan African in the early 20th century, see 
Alexandre Mboukou, ‘The Pan African Movement, 1900 – 1945: A Study in Leadership Conflict 
Among Disciples of Pan Africanism’, Journal of Black Studies, 13, No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 275 – 
278.  
70 Aydin, The Politics of Anti – Westernism, p. 8.  
71 Merle C. Ricklefs, ‘The Dragon’s Stir’, Wild, Colin and Peter Carey, eds., Born in Fire: The 
Indonesian Struggle for Independence, An Anthology (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 
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prosperity and world peace on a democratic and secular basis.’72 The second was 
the maintenance of friendly relations from the West. This was largely based on 
Ghandi’s views, and his desire to have ‘honourable and voluntary cooperation 
based on mutual respect and trust.’  
Indian nationalism was furthermore linked to the prospect of a united 
Asian continent. Sorojini Naidu, a prominent intellectual of the period, presented 
a rather grand vision for India to ‘play a part in the great international 
development of the world.’73 Pan – Asianism was thus used much in India as 
political currency for nationalism 
Indonesia’s engagement with pan – Asianism was much more closely tied 
to the development of its own brand of nationalism. Like most countries of the 
region, Indonesia experienced a national awakening in the early 20th century. 
This was, according to Nagazumi, inspired by numerous colonial struggles 
around the world, most notably the Boer uprising and the Russo – Japanese 
War.74 Indonesia’s nationalism however interacted much more with Pan – 
Islamism. Ricklefs states that it was part of ‘Unmat Islam,’ the emerging view 
among Muslims in the early 20th century that they were part of a global 
community.75 Indonesia’s brand of nationalism however was in itself regional, 
given that Indonesia was a region with extreme linguistic and political diversity. 
A united Asia, or rather a united South East Asia was often applied to make the 
case for the one Indonesian nation.  
                                                        
72 Quoted in Janyantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, ‘The Non – Aligned Movement and International 
Relations’, India Quarterly, 33, No. 2 (April 1977), p. 139.  
73 Quoted in Bandyopadhyaya, ‘The Non – Aligned Movement and International Relations’, p 138.  
74 Akira Nagaumi, ‘National Awakening’, in Colin Wild and Peter Carey, eds., Born in Fire: The 
Indonesian Struggle for Independence, An Anthology (Athens, OH.: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 
14.  
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Overall, Pan – Asianism and pan nationalism in general portray a history 
of internationalism that was entirely separate from both the liberal 
cosmopolitanism of the West or even the Marxist internationalism of the Soviet 
bloc. It was a common ideology or approach to international relations that 
coloured the way newly decolonising states approached international relations 
in the immediate post war period.   
 
Anti Imperialism 
  
In concurrence to the development of Pan – Asianism and other forms of 
pan - nationalism, the years between the 1920s and 1930s saw the growth of 
global anti – imperialism. As argued above, Pan – Asianism, Pan – Islamism and 
Pan – Arabism were some of the most prominent transnational movements 
outside Europe. Pan – Africanism was also emerging in a significantly weaker 
capacity.76 Eventually by the 1920s, the notion of a global alliance against 
imperialism, stretching across all regions, was starting to take shape. This 
occurred at the Conference of Brussels in 1927, which aimed to create an 
international ‘League Against Imperialism.’ Among some of the most important 
norms emerging form this conference were colonial solidarity and a disavowal of 
imperialism in the general and universal sense.  
The conference began with intentions that were quite far removed from 
what it ultimately produced. Brussels was largely a communist endeavour 
spearheaded by two communists living in Berlin named Willi Muzenberg and 
                                                        
76 For a comprehensive history of Pan – Africanism, see J. Ayodele Langley, Pan – Africanism and 
Nationalism in West Africa, 1900 – 1945: A Study in Ideology and Social Classes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973).  
 24 
Virendranath Chattopadhyaya.77 Furthermore, it was covertly financed by the 
Comintern in the hopes of instigating revolution throughout the world’s 
colonies.78 Even the name of the conference stemmed from Soviet perceptions of 
the world order at the time. The League Against Imperialism was a play on the 
League of Nations, which the Soviet Union still accused of being a Western 
Capitalist Plot.79 Furthermore, the desire to build solidarity among colonial 
resistance movements was in keeping with the Soviet Union’s policy of 
supporting communist revolutions across the world.80 
The conference however could hardly be termed very communist in 
nature. The majority of attendees and key voices were non – communist 
nationalists, including people such as Nehru from the INC and Chiang Kai Check 
from the Kuomintang. Prashad argues that this was largely the reason for the 
ultimate demise of the League as an institution, given that it was ultimately 
superseded by a variety of nationalist struggles in all the home countries.81 
While dying soon afterwards, the League Against Imperialism translated 
into many nationalist movements and was retained in national memories. Such 
was the case in India, and can by seen by some of the changes in Nehru’s rhetoric 
following the conference. He said in his 1929 address that ‘India’s movement 
must link with a series of movements, not necessarily in line with the INC’s 
vision, including the labour movement in the West and nationalist movements in 
                                                        
77 Prashad, The Darker Nations, p. 20.  
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the Middle East.’82 The period after Brussels thus saw some synchronisation in 
the previously disparate and insular nationalist movements in Asia. As Nehru’s 
language shows, there was an emerging trend from the late 1920s to present a 
global struggle against imperialism, with the nations of Africa and Asia on one 
side, and the Nations of Europe and America on the other..   
 
The Post – War Order and the Move towards Afro – Asian Solidarity 
 
 The legacies of Pan – Asianism and anti – imperialism were beginning to 
be felt in the early years of the United Nations. Arab and East Asians would form 
a bloc in regards to gaining representation in various leadership roles in the 
United Nations. According to Alden et. Al, the first electoral behaviour was seen 
in the elections of the President of the General Assembly, the 7 Vice Presidents 
and the chairmen of the 6 GA committees.83 Alden et. al states that this was 
incredibly important for the interests of various Africa and Asian countries. This 
was because the Vice Presidents and Chairmen formed the General Committee, 
which was responsible for setting the agenda of the General Assembly.84 Already 
in 1946, many common issues were beginning to appear for these two regions. 
The right to national self – determination was one, as well as the nature of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.85 Mechanisms for decolonisation were 
also a clear issue, as the UN Charter was never meant to address the question of 
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territories that had existed as colonies before WWI.86 According to Alden et. al, 
what the European powers did in their won colonies fell under their domestic 
jurisdiction.  
The immediate post – war period also saw the appearance of a few 
regional organisations, largely stemming from the history of Pan – Nationalism. 
The Arab League was one, forming in May of 1945 to ‘coordinate collaboration 
between them [Arab states], to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, 
and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.’87 
In East Asia, calls towards regional alliances were largely restricted to Indian 
diplomatic circles.88 Indian foreign policy had for a while been linked to the 
notion of leadership over a united Asia. United by common ties in the League 
Against Imperialism, individuals such as Nehru and Nasser began making the 
move to create a third Cold War bloc, mainly through the creation of the Arab 
Asian Group in 1950.89 Such events were ultimately affected by the common 
diplomatic history of these elites, which tended to form a clear consensus on 
their vision of a post war order. This order was based on a united Africa and Asia 
that could bring about a final end to all forms of colonialism, and which saw their 
own countries taking ownership of internationalism and the ideals of the UN.  
 
 
 
                                                        
86 The trusteeship system of the UN dealt with territories that had previously been under the 
control of the Axis powers, and also states that had been under League of Nations mandates. 
87 Pact of the League of Arab States, available on the public website of the Yale Law School, 
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Conclusion 
 
The first half of the twentieth century saw the growth of two major 
internationalist trends. One was the internationalism between the states of 
Europe and the Americas that led to the San Francisco conference and the birth 
of the United Nation. The other was Afro – Asian solidarity, which would not 
emerge in a coherent form until the first instances of decolonisation. The roots of 
Afro – Asian solidarity lay in a completely different tradition of internationalism 
to those that operated in the West. This was not based in Kant’s theories nor on a 
common experience of WWII. Cooperation among the African and Asian states 
was based on a common experience of, and struggle against imperialism. 
Combined with Pan – Asianism and other forms of pan – nationalism, this shared 
experience provided the political and cultural premise for holding the Bandung 
Conference. In the next chapter, I will argue how the Bandung conference finally 
solidified these many ideologies into a series of norms that formed the basis for 
cooperation in the African and Asian world.    
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Chapter Two 
The Bandung Conference and its Aftermath: From Afro – 
Asian Solidarity to Non - Alignment 
 The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a wave of decolonisation that rapidly 
grew the number of the world’s states. These states were very much outside the 
diplomatic networks that permeated the Western and Eastern (Soviet) worlds, 
as their diplomatic elite lacked the same institutional history. Furthermore, 
many were not yet members of the United Nations, and would not be so for at 
least another year. Those that were members played a generally marginal role in 
a time when the UN’s bureaucracy was much smaller and the Security Council 
was considerably more active.90 Lacking diplomatic alternatives, the newly 
independent state of Africa and Asia were led into bilateral relationships with 
old powers. Such was the dynamic at play, Mackie argues, in the development of 
collective defence agreements such as SEATO and CENTO.91 Without their own 
diplomatic networks, one would have assumed that the African and Asian states 
would have been subsumed into either side of the Cold War. However, the 50s 
and 60s saw the emergence of a vibrant third bloc that tended to act 
independently. The foreign policies of this bloc’s constituent states were 
determined by the outcome of the Bandung Conference, which created the 
identity of the Third World from the preceding Afro Asian Solidarity Movement.  
                                                        
90 See Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume 2: The Age of Decolonization [sic], 1955 
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 This chapter argues that the Bandung Conference solidified a set of norms 
that guided the actions of most newly decolonised or decolonising African and 
Asian states following 1955. These norms were: a commitment to Non – 
Alignment; belief in and optimism for the United Nations; a proclivity towards 
caucusing and collective voting; and a commitment to mutual assistance. This 
chapter will begin by presenting the immediate background to the Bandung 
Conference, and the emergence of Afro – Asian Solidarity, focusing on 
Indonesian, Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) and Indian diplomatic circles. It will then 
present an overview of the conference, arguing that it negotiated a series of 
norms that were embodied in the final communiqué. The chapter will then look 
briefly at the emerging Non – Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, which 
were two of the many products of the conference.  
 
A Grand Asian African Alliance: The Road to Bandung 
 
The Bandung Conference was set in motion by the efforts of Sir John 
Kotewalala, the prime minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), when he called for an 
‘informal meeting’ involving the heads of government of Pakistan, India, Burma, 
Indonesia and Ceylon.92 Jamie Mackie, who has written one of the most 
comprehensive secondary accounts of the Bandung Conference in the English 
language, notes that the purpose of the conference was somewhat ambiguous.93 
This is reflected by the comments of the other participants. Ali Sastroamidjojo 
reflected in his memoirs that it seemed odd that Kotelawala simply wanted all 
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93 Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 55.  
 30 
the heads of government to ‘get to know each other.’94 He further stated that it 
was unusual he should call it an ‘informal’ gathering, given that such a meeting of 
heads of government would ‘by its nature be perceived as formal.’95 In his 
memoirs, Kotelawala noted that it was important for the Asian states to start 
building trust and come to have a united stance on a variety of matters.96 This 
was linked to Kotelawala’s particular brand of nation – building, which was 
linked quite strongly to Pan – Asianism. Kotewala believed that national unity 
could be achieved by Ceylon being an international leader and acting as a ‘Voice 
for Asia.’97 Becoming such would have probably also strengthened Ceylon’s case 
for being accepted as a member of the UN, after having it’s application rejected 
over ten times. It was no accident that Kotelawala had floated the idea for the 
Colombo meeting at the Annual Dinner of the United Nations Association of 
Ceylon.98 
 The meeting was also conceived in a time of great uncertainty for the 
larger South and South – East Asian states. The Indo – Chinese conflict and the 
principles and approaches of the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were 
soon to give rise to organisations such as SEATO.99 The rise of collective defence 
agreements was significantly restricting the diplomatic manoeuvrability of 
countries that were aspiring to become economic, cultural and military leaders 
in the region.100 The Colombo Conference was possibly an opportunity for those 
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countries pursuing ‘free and active’ foreign policies and seeking to be leaders in 
the region to gauge each other’s positions, and coordinate their diplomatic 
efforts.  
 It was at the Colombo Conference that the proposal for an Asian African 
Conference first gained a hearing.101 The idea came not from Kotelawala, but 
from the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sastromidjojo. The Prime Minister had 
made it a condition of his attendance that the question of a ‘conference of a more 
comprehensive nature’ would be included on the agenda. 102  Much like 
Kotelawala’s move to hold the Colombo conference, the prospect of an Asian 
African conference was influenced by Pan – Asianism and the desire among 
every Asian leader to be a ‘voice of Asia.’103 As for Africa, Sastroamidjojo was of 
the belief that Asia and Africa shared common concerns and aspirations 
concerning the current states of world affairs.104 This as possibly due to what 
was established at Brussels, namely the belief that the struggle against 
imperialism was a global one. The prime minister had made sure to include input 
from his diplomats in various African states when creating the proposal. This 
was mainly done through the Tugu meeting held several months earlier between 
the Indonesians heads of diplomatic missions in Asian and Africa.105  
 While certainly influenced strongly by Pan – Asianist and Anti – 
Imperialist ideals, the move to hold the Asian – African conference was also a 
strategic calculation on Indonesia’s part, and a realisation of the foreign policy 
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doctrines that had come to emerge under Sastromidjojo and Sukarno. The 
doctrine was Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ policy, conceived in response to the 
regional security agreements that were emerging under the US Secretary John 
Foster Dulles in South East Asia.106 The policy was quite strongly linked to 
Indonesian nationalism, which was aspirational and based on leadership in the 
region.107 This was related to the fact that Indonesia was so multi ethnic and 
multination, and was in most ways already being a regional leader purely by 
existing as one sovereign state. Faced with skyrocketing inflation and frequent 
government reshuffles, the time for Indonesia to live up to its ‘free and active’ 
policy was looming with greater urgency.108 With Cold War tensions mounting, 
Indonesia was presented with an opportunity for regional leadership through 
Bandung. Sastroamidjojo noted in his autobiography: 
 
‘In my initial statement to the DPRS I had also stressed that the activeness 
of our foreign policy should mean active participation in the efforts to 
reduce cold war tensions . . . world peace was not only something craved 
for all of mankind; it was also in our national interest and an 
indispensible condition for rapid and orderly development of our country 
and people.109  
 
 Sastroamidjojo’s proposal did not receive a great deal of enthusiasm in 
Ceylon. Several other concerns dominated the Colombo conference, namely the 
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conflict in Indo – China and the upcoming Geneva conference.110 Nehru most 
notably expressed scepticism regarding the viability of such an endeavour. As 
Mackie suggests, this was because he was not willing to take on an overly 
idealistic stance at such a politically delicate moment for the region.111 
Kotelawala notes the general mood of the attendees in his memoirs, stating that 
they ‘were anxious to avoid anything which might hinder the negotiations in 
Geneva, where much recalcitrance was being expressed from certain 
quarters.’112  In a letter to his Chief Ministers after Colombo, Nehru made almost 
no reference to Sastroamidjojo’s proposal, instead focusing on the utility of the 
Colombo meeting towards coming to a resolution in Indo – China.113 Sir John 
Kotelawala was only cautiously supportive, careful that such a conference would 
give an open forum to communist countries like China, North Korea and the 
newly forming South Vietnam.114 U Nu and Mohammed did not have strong 
feeling either way, being much more heavily concerned with the upcoming 
Geneva Conference.  
As a result, the final communiqué of the Colombo conference produced a 
rather low-key statement about the prospect of an Asian – African conference. It 
stated simply that the ‘Indonesian Prime Minister discussed the possibility and 
desirability of holding a conference of Asian and African Nations.’115 It was not 
for another few months that the idea for the conference gained popularity. This 
was a result of several international events. One was the unsatisfactory outcome 
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of the Geneva Conference and the further strengthening of collective defence 
agreements.116 Another was the continued rejection of several applications for 
membership in the UN. According to Mackie however, the major catalyst was 
Nehru’s turnaround. In September of 1954, Sastromidjojo made a speech in the 
Indian Parliament.117 In this speech, he referred as he had before to Pan – 
Asianism and to the common struggle against imperialism. He also made 
reference to the need for Afro – Asian Unity, and about the dangers of new forms 
of imperialism.118 Sastroamidjojo’s lobbying led to a significant turnaround by 
Nehru, who began to view the conference as another opportunity for expanding 
India’s emerging programme of non – alignment. 119  On the other hand 
Indonesian historian Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that Nehru’s change in attitude 
was more heavily influenced by Zhou Enlai’s visit to New Delhi, which was when 
the two leaders formulated the Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence.120  Both non – alignment and the Panchsheel would feature heavily 
in what was debated at Bandung, and what was ultimately produced in the 
communiqué.   
 The Bogor Conference came soon after Nehru’s rather public change in 
attitude. Composed of the Colombo 5, it was chaired by Ruslan Abdulgani, the 
Indonesian Foreign Minister.121 Numerous problems abounded, namely the 
question of who to invite. Nehru’s position was that the conference should be as 
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representative as possible of the Afro – Asian region, which meant inviting 
Israel.122 Pakistan and Indonesia maintained their opposition to this specific 
question as would be expected.123 In the end, the 5 countries came to an 
understanding that not inviting Israel was the pragmatic option, as it would 
mean the non – attendance of all Arab countries.124 Another question was 
whether countries that weren’t yet independent should attend. It was decided 
that the British trust territory of the Gold Coast (Ghana) would be given observer 
status.125 The question of inviting China and other communist countries was also 
rather challenging, with Kotelawala maintaining opposition all the way.126 Nehru 
had a strong interest in having China attend, as it could use this to diffuse 
tensions with other Asian states over its rather controversial alliance.127 As a 
compromise, the two Koreas were not invited but China was.128 In the end, 30 
countries were invited, of which 29 attended. The countries were: Afghanistan; 
Burma; Cambodia; Ceylon; People’s Republic of China; Cyprus; Egypt; Ethiopia; 
India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Japan; Jordan; Laos; Lebanon; Liberia; Nepal; 
Pakistan; The Philippines; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Sudan; Thailand; Turkey; The 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam); The State of Vietnam (South 
Vietnam); Yemen; The Gold Coast (observer status). 
 The politics at play in each of the 29 countries in the lead up to conference 
is a subject for another work, but a considerable amount of interactions were 
made to get many of the Middle Eastern and African states to attend. Once Nehru 
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was invested in the conference, he took the lead in lobbying the key figures of 
Africa and the Middle East.129 As the ‘intellectual father of non – alignment, 
Nehru appealed primarily to the many antipathies towards the Cold War.130 
Increasingly, attending the Bandung Conference also became a strong political 
gesture that showed the cosmopolitan outlook of attending countries. China’s 
attendance was based on such, as it wanted to use the conference to ‘defeat the 
Western isolation imposed on it.’131  Overall, the strategic imperatives for the 
conference were coloured by the cultural affinity all the attending countries had 
towards the movement against imperialism. While emerging from the foreign 
policy directions of the Colombo Five, the idea and drive for the conference was 
very much a product of anti-imperialism and the now emergent ideology of Afro 
– Asian Solidarity. 
  
At the Conference 
 
 Effects and concrete actions aside, the conference held incredible cultural 
resonance across the globe when it was held. At its start, the main theme of the 
conference was a celebration of the cultural diversity of Africa and Asia. Richard 
Wright, an attendant of the conference, noted that the opening was dominated by 
‘pleasantries’ and opportunities to ‘showcase national identities.’132 Wright’s 
account shows that Afro – Asian Solidarity was very much an explicit theme. 
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Describing the opening ceremony, he states that there ‘was a forest of banners 
proclaiming Afro-Asian Solidarity.’133 Media report from most Western countries 
tended to focus on the historic nature of the conference as a ‘coloured 
conference.’134 The Washington Post stated that it was ‘the first time in history 
that Asian and African nations have attempted to solve their problems without 
interference or advice from the United States or European powers.135   
With its clearly raced elements, the conference also featured as a potent 
symbol for oppressed peoples around the world. Richard White, an African –
American author and left wing activist was one such example. His account, the 
Coloured Curtain, is a good window into how the Bandung Conference was 
perceived by people who perceived themselves as fighting either against 
colonialism or racism. He states in his chapter on race at Bandung that: 
 
‘Before Bandung, most of these men had been strangers, and on the first 
day they were constrained with one another, bristling with charge and 
countercharge against America and/or Russia. But, as the days passed, 
they slowly cooled off, and another and different mood set in [sic]. What 
was happening? As they came to know one another better, their fear and 
distrust evaporate. Living for centuries under Western rule, they had 
become filled with a deep sense of how greatly they differed from one 
another. But now, face-to-face, their ideological defences dropped. 
Negative unity, bred by a feeling that they had to stand together against a 
                                                        
133 Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, p. 132.  
134 George Sokolsky, ‘Bandung Conference is Conference of Race’, Washington Post and Times 
Herald, April 21 1955, p. 17.  
135 No Author, ‘Colonialism is assailed at Bandung’, The Washington Post, April 18 1955, p. 1.  
 38 
rapacious West, turned into something that hinted at the positive. They 
began to taste their combined strength.’136   
 
The tone of the conference was set by Sukarno’s opening speech. Here, he 
identified the uniting factor of the countries as a ‘common detestation of 
colonialism.’137 He further linked the geopolitics of those attending, noting that 
they formed the ‘lifeline of imperialism.’138 Much of Sukarno’s rhetoric thus drew 
upon older Pan – Asianist and Anti-Imperialist sentiments. However, it portrayed 
some emergent ideas that did not become widespread among the countries of 
Asia and Africa until some years later. The main one was that the countries of 
Africa and Asia should be guardians of peace. Noting the dangers posed by 
nuclear weapons, he stated that the countries of Asia and Africa have a duty to 
stand up against the military arms race between the USA and the USSR.139 While 
making no mention of the United Nations, Sukarno presented what could quite 
clearly be conceived as a reference to the first line of the charter. This was when 
he said ‘we the peoples of Africa and Asia.’ Given that the UN was not universal at 
the time, Sukarno may have been making a call for the African and Asian states to 
take a lead in the UN project and the project of world peace. Such seems 
apparent when considering the remainder of the excerpt: 
 
‘We the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000 strong, far more than half 
the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called 
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the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to 
the minority of the world which lives on other continents that we, the 
majority, are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have 
will always be thrown on to the side of peace.’140 
 
Other countries echoed many of the sentiments and internationalist 
ideals given by Sukarno in the opening session. While not a pervading theme in 
the meetings of the Colombo Five, the notion of a united Asia and Africa was 
constantly revisited by the few Sub-Saharan representatives. The Liberian 
representative stated that the coming age represented ‘a new awakening on the 
part of the peoples of these two great continents.’141 Race was also a key element 
in Liberia’s speech, saying that the coming age ‘should be regarded as the birth of 
a dynamic concept designed to engender and accelerate positive and lasting 
interest in the achievement of universal peace, abiding friendship, unfading 
equality and untrammelled justice regardless of race, creed economic status or 
clime.’142 The representative from the Gold Coast (Ghana) made an even stronger 
reference to the obviously raced element of the conference. Noting various 
struggles in Africa, the representative for the Gold Coast asserted a racist bias in 
the internationally recognised right to sovereignty, which was used by colonial 
powers to stave off criticism about their colonies He further stated that, ‘the 
struggles and sacrifices of these [African] nations have in our day re-established 
and fortified the right of all races to govern themselves; they are a shining 
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example to all those labouring under racial discrimination, political subjection 
and economic exploitation.’143 
Of course, a conference of such an expansive nature was also a prime 
opportunity for many countries to advance their own agendas, many of which 
were not as widely shared by all the attendees.  Nasser emphasised Israel in his 
speech quite strongly, stating the situation in Palestine was ‘an injustice [that] is 
unrivalled in the modern world.’144 The castigation of Israel in such a forum was 
not in the interest of East Asian nations such as Japan, who were trying to build 
up positive relations with the new nation while also remaining part of the Afro – 
Asian club.145 Iran, with its close relationship to the US, focused heavily on the 
merits of trade agreements with major powers, stating that ‘such collaboration 
carried on alongside with national plans of development and reconstruction is 
[sic] most efficient for solving the country’s [Iran’s] pressing economic 
problems.’146 Zhou En Lai of China was predictably the last to speak, being one of 
the most controversial attendants. Zhou’s stance was labelled by most 
commentators as ‘conciliatory,’ which was to be expected given Zhou’s particular 
brand of diplomacy. Zhou’s heavy focus on the relatively non – controversial 
themes of cultural and historical ties in the region was demonstrative of this. He 
stated, ‘the peoples of Asia and Africa created brilliant ancient civilisations and 
made tremendous contributions to mankind. But, ever since modern times, most 
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of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to the 
plunder and oppression of colonialism, and have been forced to remain in a 
stagnant state of poverty and backwardness.’147 Zhou En-Lai’s speech also 
foreshadowed some of the more criticised norms that would later form a 
significant part of relations in the ‘Southern World.’ These were ‘mutual respect 
for territorial integrity,’ ‘non interference in each others affairs’ and ‘the peaceful 
coexistence of countries with different social systems.’148 Decades later, when 
many Southern countries were put centre stage for violations of human rights 
and other international laws, it was the appeal to such norms that quashed 
criticism and international action.149  
 
Tensions Arise 
 
The pleasantries did not last long. Once the conference moved to 
committees, a number of considerable tensions started emerging. The first and 
probably most salient tension was over the definition of imperialism. This 
occurred in political committee when Kotelawala dropped what journalists and 
historians writing about the conference have called the ‘bombshell.’ In a very 
passionate speech, Kotelawala alleged that communism was not only a form of 
imperialism, but was also the most pressing form of imperialism in the world at 
the time. He stated: ‘think, for example, of those satellite states under Communist 
domination in Central and Eastern Europe . . . if we are united in our opposition 
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to Colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to 
Soviet colonialism as much as Western imperialism?’150  
Kotelawala was promptly joined by Mohammed Ali from Pakistan, as well 
as the delegations for Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya and the 
Philippines. These countries proposed a resolution that would condemn ‘all 
types of colonialism, including international doctrines resorting to the methods 
of force, infiltration and subversion.’151 Implicit in this resolution of course, given 
the content of Kotelawa’s speech, was an accusation of communism as a form of 
imperialism.   
While being praised in the American and European press as a stalwart 
against communism, Kotelawala’s move attracted significant anger from some of 
the big players at the conference.152 Commenting on the situation in his memoirs, 
Sastroamidjojo called Kotelawala the most ‘undiplomatic and diplomats.’153 
Throwing around the word colonialism was no laughing matter, as it still held an 
immense historical resonance for the countries present. Such an accusation 
threatened to make the conference degenerate into the very debates that had 
caused the United Nations to stagnate and become a propaganda tool for the two 
sides of the Cold War. Furthermore, Kotelawala had made some extremely 
hostile statements towards China, demanding that it should take part in 
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dissolving the Cominform as ‘proof of its good intentions.’154 As noted by an 
article in the Mobile Press, the prime minister asserted this action was a 
prerequisite for taking part in Nehru’s neutralism.155 The situation was very 
worrying for Sastroamidjojo, who was chair of the political committee and was 
thus responsible for ensuring a result. He stated in his memoirs, ‘I was well 
aware it could end in failure because of this incident, and as a result Indonesia’s 
name and prestige would be greatly diminished.’156 The situation was also 
worrying for Nehru, whom Sastroamidjojo recalls getting locked into a serious 
debate with the Ceylonese Prime Minister.157  
Such a derailment was also of serious concern for China. As argued above, 
China had been trying to branch out from it’s diplomatic dependence on the 
Soviet Union, a task that was extremely difficult given its level of isolation from 
the rest of the world.158 China’s strategy for achieving this was to build up 
cultural relations with the more neutral countries of Asia and Africa. This was 
done mostly through the establishment of the Chinese People’s Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries, which was responsible for ‘the establishment 
of cultural relations with foreign countries.’159 The job of this association was to 
engage in what Zhou had called ‘popular diplomacy,’ which involved ‘people to 
people contact . . . influencing international opinion.’160 This constituted much of 
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the thinking for example, behind the 5 principles of peaceful coexistence, which 
were co-authored by Nehru and Chou Enlai.161 A shift in the debate from cultural 
affinity at Bandung threatened much of China’s foreign policy plans.  
The tensions between China and Ceylon were eventually resolved, to 
some degree via Sastroamidjojo’s intervention. Left in a room personally with 
Chou Enlai and Kotelawala, the Indonesian prime minister attempted to 
reconcile their difference and find a form of words that was acceptable to both 
parties.162 Kotelawala furthermore stated that he meant no offense by the 
statement and simply ‘wanted to get it off [his] chest.’163 Given the very positive 
portrayals of the Prime Minister in the US media following the outburst, it’s quite 
clear that ‘getting off his chest’ without derailing the conference was an exercise 
of political expediency. The mainstream American press almost universally 
portrayed Kotelawala as a tireless soldier against communism, often through 
endearing phrases like ‘strong Sir John.’164 The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin 
declared him a ‘new voice and a new ideal in Asia,’ an image Kotelawala had 
already been cultivating for himself and for Ceylon since independence.165 As for 
the tension over the definition of imperialism, this was resolved according to 
Mackie over a very masterful form of words.166 After considerable negotiation, 
the final wording of the communiqué included a condemnation of imperialism in 
all its ‘manifestation,’ rather than all its ‘types,’ as Kotelawala and his 
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sympathisers had originally proposed.167 From the Ceylonese Prime Minister’s 
perspective, communism was indeed a ‘manifestation’ of colonialism, meaning 
he was amenable to the wording. Chou however thought otherwise.168 Such may 
have simply been due to the bad connotations the word ‘type’ had acquired.    
 The second major tension in committees was over world peace and the 
existence of collective security arrangements. Many of the attending states were 
members of either SEATO or CENTO, Thailand and Turkey being respective 
examples.169 India and Indonesia on the other hand had a strong policy of 
neutralism, Indonesia through its ‘free and active’ policy and India through the 
policy of non - alignment.170 In an effort to drive forward his policy of non – 
alignment, Nehru was quite determined to have something resembling the ‘5 
principles of peaceful coexistence’ or Panchsheel in the final declaration.171 
Neutrality and non – alignment however were quite controversial at the time, 
and had been met by deep opposition from the United States Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles.172 Famous for his remark that ‘neutralism was immoral,’ 
Dulles was of the belief that any negotiated settlement was a win for 
communism.173 In regards to Bandung, Dulles’ primary concern was that China 
would appeal to neutrality and non – alignment to ‘ensnare the relatively 
inexperienced Asian diplomats into supporting resolutions seemingly in favour 
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of goodness, beauty and truth.174 The US State Department as a result made a 
very strong effort to ensure that the Western sympathetic countries in 
attendance would not go down any such path. This was done through 
establishing the Afro – Asian Working Group and the Bangkok Group. These 
bodies were responsible for advising diplomats in the ten Western – sympathetic 
states and ensuring they came out with a united pro – Western stance.175 
It was therefore not surprising that non – alignment and neutrality were 
the issues that almost ended the conference in a deadlock. On the third day of the 
conference, the Political Committee appointed an ad hoc committee chaired by 
Nasser to study the question of the ‘promotion of world peace and cooperation’ 
and ‘the problem of dependent nations.’176 Sastroamidjojo notes that the 
committee was composed of just about every controversial or partisan attendee 
to ensure a form of words amenable to everyone.177 Despite this, the conference 
continued till 4 o’clock on the last day without a resolution. Both Sastroamidjojo 
and Kotelawala have focused on the 11th hour negotiation that allowed a 
compromise to be reached, following a speech by the Indonesian prime minister 
to the committee.178 As Mackie states, it was somewhat of wonder that the 
conference did come out with the ‘10 principles of peace,’ a form of words which 
all the participants could agree on.179 It was equally remarkable that one of the 
principles was a commitment to non – alignment, albeit in a very diluted form.  
                                                        
174 Minutes of a meeting, secretary’s office, US state Department, 7 January 1955, quoted in Ang 
Cheng Guan, ‘The Bandung Conference and the Cold War International Relations History of 
Southeast Asia’, in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 
1955 Asian – African Conference for International Order (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), p. 29.  
175 Guan, ‘The Bandung Conference and the Cold War’, p. 30.  
176 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 297. 
177 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 297.  
178 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 298.  
179 Mackie, The Bandung Conference, pp. 104 – 105.  
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The resolution of the tensions was not significant because they were 
resolved, but how they were resolved. Kahin notes that the five sponsors had 
made an explicit effort to avoid formal voting procedures, which meant that the 
conference operated by consensus.180 This was of course not the norm in most 
international fora, where decisions were made primarily by majority voting. 
While the final communiqué was diluted, its potency lay in the fact that every 
one of the 29 countries had agreed to it, and had thus declared a willingness to 
carry forward its principles.   
 
The Product: Declaration of the Asian and African States 
 
 The conference would appear not to be constructive when compared with 
many other historical international gatherings. No treaties were signed, and no 
international laws were set. All that was produced was a declaration containing a 
broad set of principles and aspirations. However, as would be seen in later years, 
these principles were expressed in the behaviour of many of the Bandung states 
when it came to the United Nations. They were also enacted by most newly 
independent states in the region, often as an expression of being African or 
Asian. The identity of the Third World was beginning to take shape. While 
originally used by Sauvy in 1953 to describe the bloc that wasn’t a bloc, the Third 
World was developing its own set of aspirations regarding the international 
order, independent of the first and second worlds. The following years saw the 
emergence of Third World institutions such as the Aligned Movement and the 
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Group of 77. These movements frequently employed and expounded many of the 
principles that were established on the floor of Bandung.  
 One of the most important aspects of the communiqué would be it’s 
commitment to non – alignment and its vision of the African and Asian countries 
as the world’s main advocates for peace. This was summed up quite pertinently 
by the so – called Ten Principles of Peace, which were: 
 
1. Respect for Fundamental human rights and for the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations 
large and small; 
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of 
another country; 
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, 
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations; 
6. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve 
the particular interests of any of the big powers. (b) Abstention by any 
country from exerting pressures on other countries; 
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; 
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as 
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other 
peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the Charter 
of the United Nations; 
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9. Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation; 
10. Respect for justice and international obligations. 
 
Non – Alignment was embodied in principle 6, which identified collective 
security arrangements, seemingly presenting an implicit connection these had to 
the ‘interests of any big powers.’ While heavily diluted from India’s original 
proposals, principle 6 was still unprecedented, as it expressed a clear 
disapproval of the bi – polar world order.  
Another key point of the communiqué was the economic 
recommendation. Most notably, the communiqué called for the establishment of 
a ‘special United Nations fund for development.’ This was a rather accurate 
foreshadowing of both the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Development Fund, 
respectively created nine and ten years later. Also quite notably, it eschewed so 
called comparative advantage and recognised that developing countries had a 
right to develop their domestic industry through protectionism. This was 
presented in Section A, sub-section 6 of the communiqué, which stated that 
‘Asian-African Countries should diversify their export trade by processing their 
raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export.’181 As Kahin noted, 
the economic committee had not been anywhere near as heated as the political 
committee, possibly due to the fact that the African and Asian countries had 
more unified interests in this area.182 By 1955, the Bretton Woods System had 
already been getting criticism, the main source of this being Latin America and 
                                                        
181 Communiqué of the Asian African Conference, quoted in Kahin, The Bandung Conference, p. 77.  
182 Kahin, The Bandung Conference, p. 18.  
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the international political economic school of Dependency Theory. The economic 
clause presented many of the basic principles of the theory, such as the right of 
underdeveloped states to develop domestic industries. Presence of such 
principle in the communiqué would have certainly tied it with the Third World 
identity, and it’s associated goals of World Peace and global economic justice.183  
Probably the most significant and surprising aspect of the communiqué 
was it’s very UN – friendly tone. The United Nations was not mentioned 
extensively in either Sukarno’s speech, or in much of the politics leading up to 
the conference. Indeed, as argued earlier, the conference was conceived largely 
in response to two things: the growth in collective defence agreements in Asia 
outside the UN; and the continued disenfranchisement of countries such as 
Ceylon from the General Assembly. The communiqué could well have gone down 
two paths. It could have noted the failure of the UN in addressing the many 
African and Asian states’ grievances, and called for alternate means of achieving 
their interests. Alternatively, it could have encouraged further development of 
and engagement with the UN, and declared it the only avenue for achieving the 
goals of the Bandung states. It seemed to go down the latter, expressing an 
unequivocal optimism for the ‘principles and aims of the United Nations 
charter.’184 The communiqué also noted that the UN should be a wholly universal 
organisation, with every state being a member. Such was made at a time when 
                                                        
183 Dependency theory was put forward by the Argentinian economist Raul Prebish in 1949. Until 
the many waves of neoliberalisation in the 70s and 80s, it served as a dominant political 
economic theory for many developing states. Dependency theory became institutionalised into 
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only 60% of the world’s states were members of this organisation, with a 
disproportionate number being European and American states.  
 
The Aftermath: The development of Southern Institution, the Non – Aligned 
Movement and the Group of 77 
 
 The norms described above soon began coming into play in the 
international sphere. In the years following 1955, several of the conference’s key 
players engaged in efforts to create more formal institutions to create a third 
bloc in the United Nations. The figures in this endeavour were the big players of 
Bandung, namely India, Indonesia and Egypt. This was not an easy task, with 
many of the Bandung states becoming racked by division in the following years. 
Diem’s close alliance with the United States continued to solidify collective 
defence agreements as the status quo, with the Vietnamese leader claiming in 
1956 that ‘neutralism has lost much of its appeal.’185 Meanwhile, Indonesia,  the 
conference’s host and conceiver, was on a root to authoritarianism and was itself 
facing charges of colonialism in regards to the situation in New Guinea. Coupled 
with the crisis in the Suez and in Hungary, the prospect of an Asian African 
Alliance was looking very bleak.  
However, as Cold War tensions came to a boiling point 1960 (the year in 
which Khrushchev banged his shoe), the fears expressed in the Bandung 
declaration were becoming a reality. Increasingly, the image of the Northern 
countries as responsible international managers was becoming tenuous. At 
                                                        
185 Quoted in Ang Cheng Guan, ‘The Bandung Conference and the Cold War International History 
of Southeast Asia’, in See Seng Tan & Amitav Acharya, eds., Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 
1955 Asian – African Conference (Singapore, NUS Press, 2008), p. 39. 
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Bandung, the attendants had floated the very empowering idea that the 
countries of Asia and Africa were best placed to be protectors of the peace, 
untainted and uncorrupted by a history of imperialism. By 1960, this seemed like 
the reality of the situation, with much of the voices for disarmament and easing 
of tensions coming from the Third World. 
In the face of these tensions, the Non Aligned Movement emerged as a 
formal institution in the year 1961. It was conceive by Tito as part of his general 
move away from the Soviet Union. The other key players however had almost all 
been heavily influential in the Bandung Conference.  This included Nehru, 
Sukarno and Nasser. Indeed, the exploration of a more general and specific 
organisation for the unaligned was a continuation of their desire for an African 
and Asian Alliance. The phrase Non alignment had already been in use in India 
since the early 50s. By 1960, non – aligned was used to describe any country that 
chose to remain neutral in the Cold War. While active neutrality in the early 50s 
was prominent in India, Egypt and Indonesia, it seemed to gain increasing 
popularity after Bandung.  
Much of the literature on the Non – Aligned Movement has drawn a strong 
link between it and the Bandung Conference. While not explicitly creating it, the 
Bandung Conference set much of the norms among the later constituent states of 
the NAM. When looking at the original declaration of the Non – Aligned 
Countries, it is easy to see many similarities in the rhetoric. The general theme of 
peace and non-violence was one. Much like the Bandung Conference earlier, the 
first Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non – Aligned countries 
had been conceived in a time of great international tension, linking this to 
colonialism. It stated that ‘to eradicate the source of conflict is to eradicate 
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colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practice a policy of 
peaceful co –existence in the world.’ It is worth noting that the world 
‘manifestation,’ used in the Bandung communiqué, was used again. The 
declaration also continued the theme of the Third World countries being the 
guardians of peace. The declaration also called for a ‘general, complete and 
strictly internationally controlled disarmament,’ much like had been stated six 
year earlier.    
The Group of 77 was formed in 1964 at the first United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. This was done in the form of a 
declaration, whereby the group expressed much of the ideas that were present in 
the economic statement of the Bandung communiqué. The Group of 77 acted 
largely as a caucus that advocated for the mutual interests of its members. To the 
present day, institutions like the IMF and the World Bank remain exclusive 
forums of development. However, as it expand to over 110 members by 1970, 
the G77 effectively meant that the economic and financial discourse of the United 
Nations were almost completely dominated by the Third World. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the Bandung Conference created a series of norms between the 
African and Asian states, and solidified the transnational identity of the Third 
World. The impetus for the Bandung Conference came from different modes of 
internationalism based in pan – nationalism and anti imperialism. There were 
several strategic considerations at hand between the Colombo five when they 
held the conference. This included the rise in collective defensive agreements, 
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which were significantly limiting the diplomatic manoeuvrability of countries 
such as India and Indonesia. However, the actions of these states were coloured 
by the history behind Afro – Asian Solidarity. 
 While representing a diverse range of states, the Bandung conference 
produced a series of norms that held hitherto unrelated peoples together; 
Among these norms were that of non - aligned and peaceful coexistence, that of 
mutual economic assistance and engagement with the United Nations. The next 
chapter will situate these norms in the many changes that occurred in the United 
Nations from 1955 to 1970.    
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Chapter Three 
Bandung in the United Nations: 
Diversity, Decolonisation, Disarmament and Development 
The previous chapter argued that the Bandung Conference created a set 
of norms that were taken up by a variety of countries in Asia and Africa in the 
international sphere. This led to the creation of the Non Aligned Movement and 
the Group of 77, the main international organisations of the Third World.186 The 
literature on the connection between Bandung and the UN however is minimal. 
Most historians see the Bandung Conference and its aftermath as something 
external to the organisation. Adebajo for example sees it as an expression of an 
‘alternate vision of world order’ to that which was established at San 
Francisco.187  
The United Nations of today is not just a legacy of the immediate post – 
war period, but a legacy of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s. This was 
when the membership of the United Nations almost tripled, and it became a near 
– universal organisation. With the creation of a myriad of new funds and 
programmes, the passage of the first international covenants on human rights 
and the commencement of the UN’s first international peacekeeping mission in 
the Belgian Congo, it was also the period by which the organisation came to full 
maturity. In short, it was when the United Nations experienced its 
sourthernisation. Whereby previously it had been an organisation of the 
                                                        
186 The twenty members were: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
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Capitalist West and the Communist East, it was by the late 1960s an organisation 
of the developed North and the underdeveloped South. 
This chapter aims to situation the Bandung Conference within the history 
of this southernisation and of the UN in general, arguing that the United Nations 
of today is as much a legacy of the Bandung Conference as meetings of the 
immediate post – war period. The aim here is not to argue that Bandung was the 
sole cause of this change, but that there was a connection between the agenda set 
at Bandung, and the confidence with which that southernisation took place 
between 1955 and 1970.   It will begin by covering some of the immediate 
changes in UN membership following the conference, namely the admittance of 
five Bandung states. It will argue that the conference served as a key point in the 
Secretary – General’s push to resolve the membership deadlock in the Security 
Council. It will then examine the greater focus on decolonisation that ensued in 
the following decade, which further expanded UN membership. As result of this, 
the Non – Alignment Movement and the Group of 77, both legacies of Bandung, 
became the most powerful bloc in the General Assembly. 
After establishing this connection, this chapter will present two of the 
main changes that occurred during this period. The first of these was a change in 
the United Nations bureaucracy. In the 1950s, countries contributed staff to the 
United Nations based on their financial contribution. These provisions were 
gradually changed to reflect geographical and national distribution. By 1970, a 
large portion of the UN’s staff and bureaucracy were from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, or the Global South. 
The second was a change in the role and the work of the United Nations. 
With the creation of UNCTAD and the UNDP, a greater proportion of the UN’s 
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work became focused technical assistance and development. The UN also 
became the primary sphere by which the countries of the South could voice their 
interests, given their lack of power in the IMF and the World Bank.  
The third and final was the changing agenda of the United Nations. Issues 
that had previously been of marginal concern took centre stage in the 1950s and 
1960s. Possibly the most prominent issue was that of nuclear disarmament, 
championed by the Non – Aligned Movement. Others were Anti – Apartheid and 
Anti – Racism.  
This chapter will conclude that the Bandung Conference should be 
considered one of the key moments in the history of the United Nations. While 
not producing any immediate results, it solidified many of the norms that united 
the Third World countries in the General Assembly during the following years, 
the same way that two different ideologies had united the Eastern and Western 
Bloc.  This ultimately turned the United Nations into what it is today.   
 
Bandung and the Secretary – General: The end of the membership deadlock 
  
The period between 1955 and 1970 saw a very large increase in the 
proportion of the world’s independent states that were members of the UN. In 
1955, the proportion stood at roughly 60%. By 1959, the percentage of what 
could be termed de jure independent states that were members of the UN had 
risen to 83%.188 By 1970, it had dropped slightly to 82%, but with almost twice 
the total number of members as 15 years earlier. Since the end of the Cold War, 
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members of the United Nations.  
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almost 100% of the world’s widely recognised states have been members of the 
UN at any given time.189 
The Bandung Conference played a central role in the expansion of UN 
membership in the 1950s.190 It caused this in two ways. Firstly, it provided a case 
for granting membership to all applicants in Security Council. Secondly, it 
brought decolonisation on the agenda of the United Nations, adding political fire 
to many independence movements around the world.  
The period between 1946 and 1955 was a turbulent one for the United 
Nations. With Cold War tensions at their height, the organisation was frequently 
used as a propaganda tool by either the East or the West. This was especially the 
case in regards to the Security Council, which the international historian Alenius 
states was ‘an important arena of Great Power politics where the general aims of 
diplomats was to strengthen the morale of one's own side, undermine the morale 
of counterparts, and perhaps above all, have neutral parties support one's 
political efforts.’191 While the Security Council gave equal floor–space to the 
USSR and the United States, the Western Bloc countries controlled the floor of 
the General Assembly. The Soviet Union’s lack of overt support in this sphere 
often gave the American media the opportunity to portray it as a belligerent.192 
GA resolutions furthermore were used to legitimise actions of the Western bloc 
countries when the Security Council failed. Such was the case in the Korean War, 
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when the Western Bloc countries used their numbers to produce a series of 
rather scathing resolutions against China.193  
A key feature of this propaganda war was a membership numbers game 
between the US and the USSR, with frequent uses of both the veto and the 
General Assembly vote to reject applicants.194 Membership vetos were often 
justified by twisting interpretations of the charter’s criterion of ‘peace loving 
nation.’195 The original intention of the clause, according to Luard, was to keep 
‘former enemy states’ such as Germany and Japan from joining.196 It was clear in 
the years following that the spirit of the clause was being abused. Between 1946 
and 1955, the Soviet Union vetoed a total of 24 applications for membership.197 
Often, the same country was rejected several times, most notably Ceylon.198 The 
US never vetoed a membership application, instead opting to rely on superior 
numbers in the General Assembly.199 One example was in 1946, when the 
General Assembly rejected the Security Council’s recommendation for Mongolia 
and Albania to become members.200 
 The static membership of the UN was a consistent source of frustration 
for the many countries in Asia. It was also a cause of frustration for the Secretary 
– General. The West’s control of the General Assembly, and by extension its 
                                                        
193 See for example: A/RES/498(V), ‘Intervention of the People’s Government of the People’s 
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control over the election of the secretariat, left the Secretary – General open to 
accusations of partisanship by the Eastern bloc. One example would be a 
response by Pravda to the Secretary – General’s Third Annual Report in 1948. In 
this report, Trygve Lie made a brief reference to the dangers of bacteriological 
warfare, an issue that had gained modest attention in the UN. The Soviet 
propaganda paper Pravda accused Trygve Lie of using it as a distraction from 
nuclear energy (the Soviet Union had not yet developed the bomb) and acting 
‘with the interests of the Anglo-American bloc.’201 The paper further stated: 
 
‘Trygve Lie twice refers to bacteriological warfare. Is not the definite 
purpose of this to distract the attention of the General Assembly and of 
world public opinion from the existing unresolved question of atomic 
energy? . . . This attitude of Trygve Lie is in accord with the interests of the 
Anglo – American bloc, but in no way conforms with the interests of peace 
and security of the peoples of the world. Thus, Trygve Lie is not only 
unobjective [sic]. In actual fact, he sides with the Anglo – American 
bloc.’202 
 
A more universal membership dominated by neutral countries may have 
reduced such accusations. This was possibly a reason for Hammarskjöld’s strong 
push to expand UN membership. Addressing the American Association for the 
United Nations in 1953, Hammarskjöld called upon membership of the United 
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Nations to be universal and available to all countries, stating that ‘the charter 
does not quite say that membership should be universal, but that is its spirit.’203  
For all those keeping watch of the United Nations, the Bandung 
Conference served as a warning of the long – term effects of the membership 
deadlock. At a press conference in April 1955, journalists asked the Secretary – 
General whether the conference was being used to ‘bypass to the United 
Nations.’204 When probed further, Hammarskjöld stated that ‘any manifestation 
of the Asian region would affect the UN in positive terms, just as the 
manifestation of a great region with a great contribution to make, tends to 
strengthen the United Nations.’205  In the following months, the Bandung 
Conference would feature quite frequently in the Secretary – General’s 
arguments for expanding membership. In his tenth annual report, Hammarskjöld 
stated that ‘the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations reflected an 
attitude and approach that may bear increasing fruit in the future and affirmed 
the strong support of all peoples represented there for the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.’206 It may’ve been possible that Hammarskjöld 
was responding to the Soviet Union’s accusations that the applicants were not 
‘peace loving.’ The Bandung Conference had shown quite resoundingly that the 
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countries of Africa and Asia were heavily committed to the United Nations and to 
international peace. 
The secretariat is not usually the first port of call when considering the 
political history of the United Nations. As Myint-U and Scott state, it is ‘tempting 
to think of the secretariat as a simple bureaucracy, with a relationship to the 
UN’s inter-governmental bodies much like the relationship between a national 
parliament or government and its civil service.’207  However, as Myint – U and 
Scott go on to argue, viewing the secretariat in this way is misleading. Far from 
being a ‘parliamentary clerk’ for the general assembly, the secretariat is 
informally a ‘global trend setter,’ which affects the United Nations role in the 
world.208 Three aspects of the Secretary – General’s role make this so. Firstly, the 
secretary – general represents, defends and interprets the ideals of the United 
Nations. Secondly, the secretariat acts as the public face for the organisation and 
its ‘aims and ideals.’209 As Myint – U and Scott argue, in the case of an 
international event, it is the Secretary – General that speaks on behalf of the 
organisation.210 Of course, the secretariat is not the United Nations, and what 
Secretary – General says does not necessarily present an accurate view of the 
international zeitgeist. Since nations are accountable to their public however, 
they must respond to this particular view. This is how the role of the secretary 
general becomes that of a ‘global agenda setter, formulating and promoting new 
ideas, say on human rights or environmental protection.’ 211  Thirdly, the 
secretariat affects the way the UN relates to its stakeholders, through control 
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over the bureaucracy. In the areas of peacekeeping and international aid, the 
nature of on – the – ground staff affects the way the UN is approached as a 
provider of services. 212  Dag Hammarskjöld certainly spearheaded many 
organisational changes in the United Nations, including a massive expansion of 
staff and budget. Changes in the bureaucracy ultimately affect member states’ 
views towards the ability and viability of inter-governmental initiatives. With 
this in mind, the Secretary – General’s efforts for expansion and the effect this 
may have had on the P5 cannot be ignored.  
The result of Hammarskjöld’s efforts for expansion was the creation of 
the ‘Good Offices Committee’ to work towards a resolution on the admission 
process The committee had three members, one of which was Egypt, a key player 
at Bandung.213 With continuing pushes from both the Committee and the 
Secretary – General, the US and the Soviet Union reached a compromise at the 
end of 1955. The compromise was that all applicants for membership would be 
considered on a case – by – case basis and on their own merits. The resolution 
would then have to be considered without amendment in the General 
Assembly.214 Another part of the compromise was that a number of Western and 
Soviet sympathetic countries were admitted simultaneously. At the end of 1955, 
the UN admitted Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain.215 
The countries at Bandung had made it quite clear that they intended to stay 
unaligned in regards to questions between the East and West. With the majority 
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of newcomers after 1956 being unaligned, the Cold War numbers game was 
effectively over, and the Security Council could get on with accepting all new 
members.  
 
Decolonisation and the UN: 1956 – 1961.  
 
Events in 1955 ended the membership deadlock, and opened up 
membership to almost all independent states. With five Asian states joining the 
organisation in 1955, including Ceylon, the United Nations was already 
beginning to look more representative. However, the real revolution in UN 
membership occurred in 1960. This was the oft – labelled ‘Year of Africa,’ when 
17 African states gained independence and were almost immediately accepted as 
members of the UN.216 The Year of Africa was part of an ongoing trend in the 
preceding 6 years, whereby the UN saw the development of its ‘decolonisation 
machinery.’217 The decolonisation machinery was, according to Luard, largely a 
political machine that embarrassed and delegitimised colonial powers, 
effectively blackballing them from friendly relations in the South.218 It also gave 
valuable political capital to independence movements across the world.  
 The question of the future of colonialism was an ambiguous one in the 
Charter of the United Nations. The Charter expressed a commitment to national 
self – determination, a legacy of the liberal internationalism behind the League of 
Nations. The world of states ruled by corresponding nationalities was a central 
part of Wilson’s 14 points, and in the context of Europe featured as a central part 
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of peacemaking on either side of WWII. At the same time, the UN charter made it 
quite clear that the UN could not interfere in matters that were within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the state.219 Colonies in Africa and Asia were within the 
domestic rule of their masters, a fact that was consistently used by the European 
powers to stave off criticism in the General Assembly. The situation in Indonesia 
in 1946 was an example, whereby the Dutch used Article 2 to bloc UN criticism of 
their repression in the colony.220 Article 73 of the United Nations made some 
provisions for ‘non self governing territories,’ simply calling upon controlling 
states to ‘take due account of the political aspirations of the people.’221 
The only formal institution for decolonisation in place in the 1950s was 
the Trusteeship Council, which was limited to the question of states that had 
previously been under axis rule.222 The only provision for considering other 
territories was contained in Article 73 (e), which obliged states to ‘regularly 
transmit information on the political, educational and economic status of their 
dependent territories.’223 This was rarely followed, with colonial states often 
claiming that the relevant territories already had degree of self – governance.224  
The many tensions between the North and South and the question of Article 7 
led to the ‘ad hoc committee to examine the information sent by the colonial 
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powers about their dependent territories.’225 Eventually, this system provided a 
way for many of the countries to sneak in discussions about various colonies.226 
The years after 1955 saw many resolutions being passed that put various 
colonial powers in the spotlight. One example would be Resolution 1461 in 1959 
on the ‘progress achieved in non – self – governing territories.’227 Such 
resolutions were often put alongside other issues. Racism was one common topic 
that was put before resolutions on decolonisation. Briefly after resolution 1461, 
there was the resolution 1328 on the question of ‘racism in non – self – 
governing territories.’228 Resolutions concerning colonies were also coupled with 
social justice issues, often using the various rapporteurs and committees to 
throw on light various forms of disadvantage. An example would be Resolution 
1462, on the question of ‘education standards in non – self – governing 
territories.’229 The effect of these resolutions was to delegitimise colonialism by 
linking it with human rights concerns, something that was becoming very central 
to the work of the UN.230 Luard sums up the position of the African and Asian 
states by saying, ‘if enough [resolutions] could be passed, surely the walls of 
Jericho would come tumbling down eventually.’231 Questions on trust territories 
were also increasingly coupled with questions on all non – self – governing 
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territories, allowing for much of the UN’s trusteeship bureaucracy and methods 
to be transferred into a variety of cases. One example was Resolution 1327, on 
the question of ‘international collaboration in respect of non self governing and 
trust territories in Africa.’ 232  This resolution called on the international 
community to work together on achieving an eventual complete decolonisation 
of Africa. 
The persistent criticism against colonialism did indeed have an effect, 
with many old colonial powers radically altering their stance in the 1960s in the 
face of new diplomatic demands. What is of particular significance however is 
when this decolonisation occurred. The wave of decolonisation following 
Bandung coincided with one of the hottest periods in the Cold War. In 1960, the 
17 new African states were effectively thrown into an organisation that was 
desperately trying to wind back the Doomsday Clock from its new time of 7 
minutes to midnight.233 The Bandung Communiqué had warned about the 
dangers of the nuclear arms race, and had proclaimed that the Asian and African 
states should take a lead in keeping the world safe from global conflict. Bolstered 
by an immense increase in numbers, Asia and Africa were well poised to fulfil 
this aspiration. An analysis of one particular letter by Nehru written in 1955 
shows the perception one of the Bandung states had of itself in the United 
Nations. 1955 was the year that the General Assembly first considered the 
creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nehru expressed grave 
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concern over the initial proposal, as it meant the IAEA would be ‘out of the 
United Nations’ direct jurisdiction.’234 In response to this, India called for the 
IAEA to be more firmly under the control of the UN, and to have members from 
Asia and Africa guaranteed.’235 Nehru’s policies in this regard were exemplary of 
the typical stance taken by the non – aligned, one of commitment to the integrity 
of the UN and its basic ideals.  
Overall, this wave of decolonisation, coinciding with the norm of non – 
alignment solidified at Bandung and the tense international climate determined 
what would be the dominant issues for majority of the UN’s members. These 
were Non – Alignment, nuclear disarmament, decolonisation and development. 
   
 
The Power of Numbers: The Non – Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 
 
The number of sovereign states in the world had increased almost two – 
fold between 1946 and 1961. The newly decolonised states lacked military and 
economic power to achieve their ends, but they did have the power of numbers 
in the world’s biggest international organisation. One nation received one vote in 
the General Assembly, and the poor and weak states represented the majority of 
nations. This meant that the United Nations was inevitably drawn in a direction 
that best served the common interests of the Southern countries. It was not 
inevitable however that all the countries of the South would bind in the General 
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Assembly. The unity of the South in the United Nations was due to various 
consensus – building institutions, namely the Non – Aligned Movement and the 
Group of 77.  
At its founding, the NAM had 25 members, with a series of declaration as 
its founding documents. Key themes were support for independence struggles 
around the world, and a call for disarmament. The next 10 years saw 
phenomenal growth in the movement, exploding to a membership of over 70. 
From its founding to the present day, the NAM has existed as a conference held 
every 2 – 6 years. In the interim, it is composed of a series of working groups and 
committees, overseen by a Secretary – General elected at each conference. These 
groups tended to operate in New York and in close proximity to the UN.236 
Tasked with producing declarations and policy position, the institution could 
best be described as a UN caucus. It sought to find a common and coherent 
stance for its members when approaching a variety of questions both within the 
UN and other spheres of international relations.  
The Group of 77 is a significantly looser organisation that is related to the 
NAM. The G77 was created in 1964 at the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development by a joint declaration. The organisation began formally at the 
Conference of the Algiers in 1967, and now has 131 members. Unlike the Non – 
Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 operates almost solely as a voting bloc. It has 
existed simply as a meeting between all relevant diplomats before each regular 
session of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it is a consensus – building 
instrument that addresses the same Third World as the Non – Aligned 
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Movement. While the NAM sought to unify the broader goals of the Southern 
countries, the G77 was a more immediate measure to bind votes in the General 
Assembly.  
These two organisations had very little hard power, both in the realms of 
security and economics. Furthermore they had little control over the 
international sanctioning of the use of force, given the existence of the veto in the 
Security Council. What they did have was immense soft power. With internal 
consensus building mechanisms and the power of numbers, they could direct 
world opinion and shift the norms of international relations in their favour. 
Possibly the two norms that were fully institutionalised into the whole of 
international society were anti – colonialism (in the classical sense), anti – 
racism and nuclear non – proliferation. 
There were some questions on which almost all of the NAM and G77 
countries would in fact bind. The creation of bodies such as UNCTAD and the 
UNDP would be some examples. There were also very united stances on changes 
or maintenances of the UN structure, given that these already tended to favour 
the Northern countries. One example would be in regards to Security Council 
reform, and the many calls to expand its membership. Another would be the 
resistance to Troika, the proposal from the Soviet Union to have three 
secretaries – general.237 Another measure would of course be changes to the 
United Nations staff and bureaucracy. This was in the mutual interest of all 
countries in the Non – Aligned Bloc, given that the majority of the staff of the 
United Nations in 1955 was Western. There changes were largely due to the 
structures of the NAM and the Group of 77, both of which were tasked through 
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their various committees and working groups with building a consensus among 
their members before each UN session or any other international forum. No such 
consensus building measure existed for such a large number of states. Given that 
colonialism, apartheid, economic assistance and disarmament were the only 
things the NAM countries could all agree on, these were the issues that tended to 
dominate debate in the General Assembly.    
As can bee seen from many third world observers of the time, economic 
demands formed a considerable portion of the Non - Aligned movement. Clifford 
Edogun, writing in 1982, calls Non – Alignment a ‘protest-demand’ ideology, 
based on said countries ‘dwindling economic and technological position vis a vis 
the capitalist world.’238 This was probably why the non aligned movement lead 
to the establishment of UNCTAD. UNCTAD went on to form a significant 
proportion of the UN bureaucracy, which increasingly became aimed at 
international aid and development.  
The amazing impact of the Non – Aligned Movement on the UN is even 
stated by the American ambassador Jackson, who states, ‘this focus [the US’s 
policy of short term litmus tests towards the NAM] has in both cases overlooked 
the movement’s impact on the United Nations where its common goals as well as 
internal divisions have shaped the overall UN agenda, and affected the workings 
of its principal organs, the General Assembly and the Security Council.’239 Jackson 
further noted that the numbers of the Non – Aligned effectively meant anything 
                                                        
238 Clifford Edogun, ‘Non Aligned Movement today: Towards an Ideological Perspective of World 
Order’, African Review, 9, No. 1 (January 1982), p. 68. 
239 Richard L. Jackson, The Non Aligned and the UN and the Superpowers (New York, NY.: Praeger 
Publishers, 1983), p. 8.  
 72 
they could agree on would ‘translated, with little change, and often over Western 
objections, into resolutions of the General Assembly.’240 
   
Staffing Changes in the United Nations 
 
One of the greatest changes to the UN structure in the year following 1955 
was its staffing practice. Before examining the significance of staffing, it is 
necessary to consider the existence of what Innis Claude has labelled the ‘two 
United nations.’ 241 According to Claude, the second United Nations is composed 
of its member states, acting in union as they so choose under the auspices of the 
UN Charter.242 The first UN is ‘constituted by its staff, an international secretariat 
or bureaucracy located in New York, Geneva and other regional headquarters.’243 
The first UN is quite important as it appeals to society, because it represents the 
‘intentions, hopes and plans of the UN.’244 As Claude summarises, this results in a 
perception of the United Nations as ‘both an arena of governments and a group 
of secretariats which actually do things.’245 
It is ultimately the General Assembly that controls the budget of the 
Secretariat, and thus has primary power over what it does. As Myint – U and 
Scott state, in the late 1940s ‘the United States and its Latin American Allies 
enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and thus controlled the Secretariat’s 
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budget.’246 This had changed by the 1960s, when the Non – Aligned bloc had a 
majority. This meant that the Secretary – General ‘came under pressure from 
new members to make the Secretariat more representative.’247 Possibly the most 
glaring and most obvious occurrence during this period of southernisation was 
the election of U Thant as Secretary General. The immense significance the 
appointment had to the view of the UN among the peoples of the African and 
Asian countries cannot be understated. Sixteen years prior, the face of almost all 
the major diplomacy in the world was white or European. Now, there was a dark 
Asian face in the highest office of the highest international organisation, and one 
from a very recent colony no less.  
As for the regular staff of the United Nations, much of the changes 
happened in the 1960s. At its inception, the majority of the staff was from 
Western countries. By the 1970s, the majority of all senior staff members in an 
organisation that was spawned by Western diplomacy were from Africa and 
Asia. Such was achieved through changes in the staffing formula that were 
pushed for by many of the Bandung, and later Non – Aligned states. In 1957 for 
example, Ceylon argued in the GA for quotas that would assign a certain number 
of positions to under-represented states. This led to a compromise position in 
1962 whereby the formula for staffing would be based on a combination of 
regional population, membership and financial contribution. Furthermore, a 
base level of 5 positions would be available to all states purely by virtue of their 
membership in the organisation. The allocation based on membership alone was 
further increased in 1976 and 1980. By 1983, only 57.2% of the staff in the 
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United Nations was determined by financial contribution alone, as opposed to 
100% in the 1950s. 35.6% of staff allocations were based on membership alone, 
and 7.2% were based on regional population.  
The effect of the staffing regime was an increase in African and Asian. 
From 1963 to 1966, there was a 50% increase in African staff, brining the total 
number up to 125, with 23 in senior position.248 An article from the New York 
Times shows that staffing measures were very active. In the fall of 1966, the 
article states that there was a mission dispatched to 20 African countries to 
recruit effective staff, returning with 8 applications.249 From the article, it is also 
seen that the unfair geographic distribution of staff was a prominent subject of 
debate for most African representatives in the United Nations.250 The primary 
subject of the article is an accusation of racism against the Secretary General of 
the UNCTAD by the Tanzanian representative Waldo E. Waldron Ramsay.251 
According to Myint – U, the influx of African staff caused a significant change in 
the working culture of the UN. As Myint – U states, a majority of the staff in the 
1950s were Americans, Canadians, and Western Europeans with predominately 
liberal value. The new political elites coming from non – Western countries 
however were predominately either ‘social democratic or statist’ and had ‘Third 
World Nationalist and anti-colonialist sympathies.’252  
It is also of note that some of the key bureaucrats and leaders of the UN in 
the following years had received their first exposure to international diplomacy 
at Bandung. This was especially the case with U Thant, who was a secretary to 
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the Bandung Conference and helped organise it.253 Considerably more so than 
the two previous Secretaries – General, U Thant was quite adamant in having 
complete control over appointments to senior positions in the Secretariat, and 
was very combatant towards the Soviets demand of Troika, which would entail 
an even division of the top positions. Among the 8 principle advisors put forward 
by U Thant, an overwhelming majority were from third world countries. Among 
the 8 countries were: Brazil; Czechoslovakia, France, India, Nigeria and the 
United Arabic Emirates.254 Clearly, the vision of both the US and the Soviet Union 
of having a staff evenly dominated by the two superpowers was coming to 
nought. The UN’s staff was becoming dominated by the non – aligned. 
U Thant’s leadership presented many departures in the work of the UN 
from the Hammarskjöld and Lie years. Most notable was the new focus on 
development. It was, as Myint – U and Scott state, under U Thant’s leadership 
that there took place a ‘huge expansion of the UN’s bureaucracy on development 
and economic issues.’255 This was the time when what is now a main role of the 
United Nations started coming into effect. According to Myint-U, the primarily 
goals in the UN in the period following the 1960s were ‘technical assistance’ and 
‘the transfer of knowledge and technology to developing countries.’256 
 
Maintenance of the United Nations 
 
 Non – Aligned countries in the 1960s kept the integrity and stability of the 
United Nations intact, instead of reforming it along many of the suggested lines 
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by the Soviet Union and the United States. There were in fact many key moments 
in the 1960s by which the United Nations faced considerable changes to its 
structure. 
 Probably the biggest impasse the UN faced was the Soviet Union’s 
proposal of Troika. This was put forward in the late 1950s and received 
increased attention after Hammarskjöld’s death. This new structure would allow 
for three secretaries – general of equal rank instead of one. One of the secretaries 
– general would be from the Eastern bloc, one from the Western bloc, and one 
from the Non – Aligned bloc. The proposal was rigorously opposed by the Non – 
Aligned at the conference of Belgrade. As soon to be secretary general U Thant 
observed, the Non – Aligned believed that such a proposal would ‘violate the 
spirit if not the world of the United Nations charter.’ They also believed that ‘as a 
simple practical matter, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to administer 
the United Nations with three chiefs of equal rank who have to agree before 
anything could be done. And with two of the three representing conflicting sides 
in the Cold War, such an agreement would seldom be possible.’257  The NAM 
countries’ clear disavowal for any change in the structure of the secretariat 
effectively killed any conflict in the General Assembly over this issue, given that 
they controlled the numbers.  
 
Changing Role of the United Nations and the Formation of New Bodies 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United Nations saw an explosion of new 
funds and new organisations that radically changed the way it operated as an 
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organisation. The late 1950s were already seeing increasing amounts of debate 
and resolutions about technical assistance and economic development. Some 
examples, both passed in 1957, include Resolution 1155 on a proposed 
‘economic commission for Africa,’ and Resolution 1156 on the ‘Expansion of 
International Trade.’258 The latter concerned the unequal trading position of 
many of the Southern countries. The former concerned the continuing 
dependence African countries had on their old colonial centres, reaffirming their 
right to build a self – sufficient industrial base. Such debates did little to address 
the economic situations in any real way, but made the inequality of the global 
trade system an area of greater concern for the United Nations. The Year of 
Africa, combined with greater attention to economic issues in the General 
Assembly, led the UN to declare the 1960s the ‘Decade of Development.’259 The 
resolution did in fact contain very similar language and aspirations to the 
Bandung communiqué, for example in its regard for self – sustaining growth and 
self reliability. It states that ‘sustain support for the measures required  . . . to 
accelerate progress towards self sustaining growth.’260 
The Decade of Development saw the creation of 5 new programmes 
directed specifically towards economic development. These were: The World 
Food Programme; the United Nations Population Fund; the United Nations 
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Conference on Trade and Development; the United Nations Development 
Programme, and the International Trading Centre. Possibly the greatest change 
the United Nations was the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). An explosion in the UN budget, brought about by 
its increasing membership accompanied the creation of these new funds. From 
1955 to 1960, the UN’s yearly budget increased from $50,665,670 ($432,050,000 
CPI 2012) per year to $168,420,000 ($998,734,940 CPI 2012) per year, resulting 
in a two – fold increase.261 Today, the United Nation’s budget is almost 10 times 
what it was in 1955, with a much greater number of assistance programmes.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s greatly changed the 
composition of the United Nations. While originally an organisation of the East 
and West, in the 1960s it became an organisation of the North and South. This 
was accompanied by many radical changes in the organisation, most notably its 
budgetary expansion and its greater focus on development and economic issues. 
It also brought a series of issues centre stage, most importantly disarmament 
and decolonization. The Bandung Conference occupied a central place in these 
changes. Firstly, it played a role in the push to make membership universal, 
something that was never intended for the United Nations at its inception. 
Secondly, it created much of the norms that allowed for the Non – Aligned 
Movement and the Group of 77 to develop. Both these groups had control of the 
General Assembly and had their own internal consensus building mechanisms, 
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meaning that the United Nations was effectively taken in any direction on which 
the Non – Aligned Countries could agree.    
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Conclusion 
 The literature around the creation of the United Nations has tended to 
focus quite extensively on its link to the League of Nations, and as an 
organisation that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. This thesis 
has argued that the Bandung conference played a key part in the creation of the 
United Nations as it exists today. This is as an organisation that is representative 
of the entirety of the world’s states, that focuses on development issues, and 
whose staff is dominated by people from the Southern World. The first chapter 
examined some of the literature on the institutional and intellectual origins of 
the UN. It then demonstrated how both the ideologies of cosmopolitanism and 
the common experience of WWII played a part in creating the organisation. The 
chapter then went on to argue that other traditions of internationalism based in 
very different visions of world order were emerging in Asia and Africa. On the 
one hand, this was based on a commitment to a united Asia. On the other hand, it 
was the ideal of a world devoid of imperialism. The chapter further argued how 
these movements affected the approaches of Asian and African diplomats in the 
post – war period.  
 The second chapter examined the Bandung Conference itself and how its 
inception was driven by the participants’ common experiences of colonialism. It 
argued that the conference created a set of norms among the participating states. 
Among these norms was a commitment to peace; mutual economic assistance 
and non – alignment. The most important norm however was that engagement in 
the UN was the best way for the Asian and African states to achieve their goals. 
The Bandung Conference turned the UN into the organisation of the third world. 
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 The third chapter examined the key changes in the United Nation from 
1955 – 1970. It argued that the Bandung Conference featured quite heavily in the 
international push to make UN membership universal. Universal membership 
was a turning point in the UN’s history, leading to many changes in the 
organisation in the decade following. This change can be best described as a  
southernisation of the United Nations, whereby the organisation became a forum 
for the interests of Southern states.  
 The Bandung Conference has rather unfortunately been forgotten in 
many popular histories of the United Nations. Instead, the dominant story of the 
United Nations is one of gradual internationalisation, starting with the 
development of liberalism in the 18th century, the creation of the League of 
Nations, and finally the passage of the charter in 1945. Why the Bandung 
Conference has been forgotten is a subject for another thesis. Perhaps a post – 
colonial perspective would offer a good critique. From its onset, the Western 
media marginalised the conference. It was not treated with the same seriousness 
as many other international gatherings that were based in the Western world. 
The effort of this thesis has been to present the United Nations as a legacy of 
Asian African internationalism as much as liberal internationalism, and thus 
present a more holistic history of an organisation that enjoys the basic support of 
every country, no matter what their political situation.  
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